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This thesis is an attempt to develop new ways of educating or
indoctrinating naval personnel on the nisalon and capability of the
Navy* in reaching this objective it was first necessary to review the
Navy's .Lesion as it relates to the national strategy of the United
Metes and to ssmasrls* its present capability to wage war.
The second phase was then to determine the amount of understand-
ing naval personnel have of these areas, and how it is distributed in
the personnel structure* This form of analysis led to the utilisation
of a descriptive type survey of 166 naval personnel. The survey study
Is the backbone of the thesis and is believed to be a significant
in the Navy's utilisation of this form of research. In this rscpsct
the survey may be considered in the nature of a pilot study which
could form the basis of a store detailed and larger scale
project. The writer ascertained during interviews with
in the Personnel Measurement Bessarch branch of the itarean of Naval
Personnel, Washington. D. G., that this study does not duplicate any
that has been undertaken by that office.
A comprehensive statement of the Hmry*B mission and a discussion
of its present capability are necessary elements in developing the
survey and interpreting the results. This unaerstanding of mission
and capabilities serves as a foundation for the entire study.
hile the fundamental mission—control of the leas has not
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changed, the means (capabilities; for accomplishing this aission hava
taken on a new look aa a result of the tremendous sciemtific develop*
ants occurring since v.orld <ar IX* Such a changing picture than is
the cause of the problem of education as seen by this writer.
Fundamental changes are taking place in three majr • physical
characteristics of the Navy; it is going from oil to naolaar energy
for power to propel its ships, from guns to guided deciles for its
araawent, and from gunpowder to atomic weapon* and supersonio planes
for its offensive power* "*ich a fluid situation calls for continual
assessment of the affect such changes hava on attitudes and abilities
of personnel who must adjust to these changes* Uo they understand the
over-all affect of these changes on their Jobs—their future as part
of the elavy team? Are they keeping up with the pace of these changes?
This study would have beam impossible without the interest and
active cooperation of the teaching staff of Boston University* s School
of Public Relations and Communications* Grateful acknowledgment is
made to its members for their helpful guidance during the formulative
and analytical stages of the study* flpoclil eoknnwlertgasnt is made to
the staff of the L&vision of Research for its contribution u> the
solution of problems involved in the survey of naval personnel*
Special recognition is acknowledged to ftfc hathan Uaccob/, Chairman
of the iiviaion of Research and Professor of Opinion hesearoh; alcolm
Kiel:, instructor in Communication Research* both tar their many help-
ful criticises of the research project and its refinement at the various
stages of progress; and to Samuel G. Atkinson, . rofessor of Public
v;NM&v
Belationa and raajer theeia adrisor, for his encouragement and gi1dance
in planting and executing tha over-ell atuoV.
considerable assistance was provided by Comiawlwr Krie S» Purdon, U3J,
uistrict *Mblie Information officer, First Kara! l'iatrict, hia etaff
and Captain V. Jf. Heola, r»Sh, Crawanrtlng Officer, U. 3. Saval Receiving
Station, Beaten, and person el of hia nn—and,
Tha writer also acknowledges with thanka tha eontribu ions *sde
by tha eeveral naval reaerviat graduate atudenta at eostan University
who contributed idaaa for use in the questionnaire and aided in ite
preliminary check on validity*
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tee Torld ar II there hare been a nastier of important
in the fundanental concepts of sea power, strategy, t^ctica, and
systems* Two major factors have caused these changes preasurss of the
cold war and a number of great aoientifio developments* Of major
concern to the Department of the fcavy la the effect of these rapid
changes on the attitudes, understanding, and adjnatmante required of
its personnel.
Hataaaal at Mai B Mai > lh '" :5,jr -' 0!,c li anai •%•% If to in-
vestigate, through scientific research techniques, hoe well naval par*
eon id understand the Navy's miaslon and ita capability to carry out
that oiasion. ri*hen, using the results of this investigation, to build
a plan of education to supplement or improve present ethods in aooc
plishing this objective.
of the study* A basic consideration in this study waa
the realization that motivation, or intereet-«ttltude levels of person-
nel, in these areas ia of an extremely heterogeneous nature when con-
sidering the entire personal structure of the Mary* Psychologically,
however, knowlcdgaability in these areas contributes greatly to the
total character development of the man In uniform, his adjustment to
;,»•.
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the iervice, by a bettor understanding of his role in it, v*ill permit
htm to function nor* efiectively in future lailitary assignments in
which he shares the responsibilities of the global oomraiwasnta of
the Navy.
Public relations 81.71iiicance . Various studies on retention of
personnel in the .military services have pointed out that a great
1
did not feel "a part of** the service* On the contrary, a great number
felt that they were simply small "cogs" in a "big machine,
"
These people could not relate their daily tasks to the larger
purpose or objective of their command unit, or in turn, to the over-ell
aiseion of their branch of service. The public relatione problem then
is to help naval personnel understand the nature of their tasks and to
give than recognition as human beings*
Whan this is accomplished, the N'svyman's attitude to his work
and shipmates should improve; he will become more of a group member
reflecting a higher degree ef esprit de corps . His personal and family
relationships shoul also improve bsaauas he knows better why he is
in uniform, in which direction he is heading, and how to get there*
Deeausa he has aoro confidence in himself, understanding his own goals
better, he is better able to carry out the Navy 1 * mission. This well-
adjusted individual than becomes a mors effective "salesman" or
1
Conclusions fro a study of 211 officers leaving the Kavy in
September, 19j6, showed that greater leadership emphasis was neadad
to give junior officers na sense of belonging*1 and to famish them
"information on the >,avy»s role, missions, and future," The survey
was conducted by the Personnel Analysis Division, tiHremu of naval
Parsennel, and reported in the Officer taj 3ook> *AY?aa 158*8,
(Washington: Department of the Ssvy, 1936), p. 2-8.
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"spokesosn" for the Navy. Instead of * negative attitude he will
begin to think constructively in torus of career planning*
The i.avy will benefit tremendously by iaprovint theee attitudinai
traits of character, confidence, and wall-being since they nenifest
thamselvee so predominately in interpersonal relations—a fimrtertsntal
eonslderation in comunieating with people in sere meaningful says*
IX. LUAIXaTKliS Of THK STOW
The study is an atteapt to measure anosledgs levels, attitudes
and opinions of a eaaplo representing as closely as possible the en-
tire personnel structure of the Navy, octal science research tech-
niques have been need but due to geograpiiloal considerations the survey
ess conducted in the area of Boston (for enlisted eon), and by soil
(for officers) within the First Naval District ( Masseohnsetts, New
|BJ| b tffSj "taine, Wd fetfe slana, i.-cludinj: 3hips op- rating fci Uie
ix. iKflfamiGbs or
'1oaion. The fundanental wartiae sission of the fcavy is to
trol the seas and deny their use to the enemy. ..hile this basic
assignment has not changed, the nature and scops of the various roles
involved have changed considerably since .oriel tear XX* These will be
discussed in detail in Chapter IX*
oles. For this paper "roles" are considered to be specific aspects,
or tasks, that in the aggregate oo pose the Navy's mission. In this
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unctions* This ter& is synonymous with "responsibilities*
"missions," and "tanks" as defined in the directive issued by the
Secretary of Defense in 19b3 to clArily the functions of the Aimed
2
Forces and the Joint Chiefs 4 ' -taff
.
Capabilitiea. This ia a generic testa applied to all offensive
and defensive warfare actions in sawy ers of the iiavy'e nission*
The tens may be broken dean to apply to a very specific, narrow task
but implies snount or volume of delivery to accomplish and sustain
the purpose or objective* Thus, a statement that the Ksvy has s
capability of airborne early warning (in a specific overseas
for eassjple) implies that enough planes and radar equipment are
available to give the mini— protection or coverage to that
If. AREA TO BE 9TUDX»
Sources of date* This study has been developed from four major
sources of iaforation* (1) a dassrlptivs survey of officers and man
on active duty in the Navy, (2) official Navy training publicationa*
(3) report on enlisted career sjaposia* and (k) interviews with
tors and others*
Method of procedure* Oats and information from these
was analysed in respect to developing the major objective of the thesis—
a plan of education*
2l fln^JMM* Analysis of data from the above sources
2
"Functions of the Armed forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
of Defense. October, ~1?53. Section VII* appearing in
definitions*
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was utilised in developing the flnal reocmeodetione in the plan of
education. Xh this process the analysis of survey findings was related
to specific reccr* ©nidations in the conclusions discussed in Chapter VI.
other sources are related to the plan wherever practicable.

CHAPTER II
One is inclined to think that the Hssy's mission is simply to
"control ths seas" and lot it go at that, Such a convenient psyoho-
logioal device for untisrstsnding ca^lcx phenomena is a gross over-
steplifioatlon of the any factors involved in forHulating the Navy* a
i, ths raws Mission
In order to gain a greater understanding of this mission it is
to discuss the concepts on which it is founded* These are
th« <MPa«P* 2L nliacal strategy and the oonoopt of sea poser,
'Concept of national Strategy* The very existence of the U. 3.
Savy is related directly to the national strategy of the United State*}
its aims and objectives, its natural resources, national income, and
forei&i commitments. These are so ,e of the determinants of national
strategy,
Mn— World ftar II the United States has assumed ths leadership
role of the free world, a role reflecting the Omairea and capabilities,
need and courage, threats and resistance, appetites and weaknesses of
sons ?0-odd nations. Admiral Carney, former Ohief of Naval Operations
saids
ith - e siting of NATO and StttGL pins all the bilateral
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must be given collective consideration, Kith each nation contri-
buting those strengths best suited to its technologies]* econonic,
political, -ilitary, and geographic circumstances • One country
nay hare non«*iilitaiy aaintensnce strength, another nay be rich
in sineral deposits, still another say have specialised in build-
ing and operating combatant tonnage.1
Conaspt of sea power* Qds msasuromsut of the status sod strength
of s country is in terns of its capacity or capability to maintain
control of the sea* The nation with control of the sea is in a position
to motivate the populations and sssmbls the material resources of the
entire free world*
The United States, according to former Secretary of the Mavy
is mors dependent than ever on overseas sources of raw materials.
Of the 77 strategic and critical materials needed for our defense
production, civilian industries, support of our economy, and
maintenance of our standard of living, 66 of them must be Imported
in whole or in part from across the oceans* In only 11 are we
self-sufficient. Without access to our transoceanic sources of
raw aterials, we could not build modern airplanes, nuclearn*J»«rod
ships, missiles, electronic equipment, and the modern machinery
of all kinds that go into our armed services.
See power, measured In ships, pianos,
span the vital lines of communication and supply; project fighting
power from the sea onto enemy soil} support our world-wide bass system}
fulfill international agreements} control sassy submarines, and
others*
1
Robert o. Carney, Admiral, U3N. "Principles of 5ea i'owsr,"
'oval institute Fmnswllnss
,
Septe ber, 1955* p. 971.
2
Charles S. Thomas, former Secretary of the Navy, In a speech
before the Symington i^boommittee, United States Sonets, June 27, 1<£6,
jawy labile statements (*ashingtont Department of the Havy, August, 19*6),
pT2*
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The laost comprehensive statement of the various roles, functions,
and responsibilities of the Navy a found in a special publication
used by the ecretary of the Wavy as a current reference source and
3
for briefing new secretaries as they are appointed.
The United ;>tates Mavy exists for two fundamental purposes.
st, the Navy's task is to support the foreign policy of the
tates In widely separated areas of the world. Haval
forces deployed for this purpose are also ready for war—Halted
war, as well as all-out nuclear war. Second, the Mevy*s role in
war is to control and use the seas for our own purposes and to
deny their use to the enemy. Of major importance is the task of
controllinc the vital sea approaches to the United tates and the
Western Hemisphere, in order to deny their use to ensmj
air-eurface, and sub-surface. The Havy oust also supply and
port the overseas operations of ground and air forces} it
maintain communications with friendly and allied nations
the globe; and it oust maintain coer.unlcation uitb United states
of raw laatcrials.
A modern, well-equipped Navy has the unique characteristic of
enabling the United states to project its national power, includ-
ing around and air elements into any strategically important area
of the globs. Naval power represents an economy of investment
in national security which cannot be matched by any other fom
of military power. nits of the fleet are part of the severely
territory of the United tates, regardless of where they nay be
operating. Ho international agreements or ensjaltossts need precede
our use of naval forces which operate in International waters of
the high seas. Naval forces are practically self-sustaining and
normally replenish themselves at
In addition to the above offensive mission, the wavy has
the responsibility of protecting the continental United states
from attack by way of the sea. Advent of the submarine capability
of launching guided rdssiles with nuclear warheads greatly increases
the antisubmarine warXare task of the Navy. Intensive research
3
The department of the Navy and Jts Secretary, a report on basic
fasts pertaining to the iavy, how it operates, and its place in the
orsjsni: ation I or national security, 'repared by the Administrative
Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy (••aahlngtom Department of





and development are needed to meat it*
Mobil* naval forces represent en investment whlsb always
remains the property of, and under the control of, the eitlaens
of the United Statea* Th* economy of naval power explains in
large measure eh/ iiations in history which havt had the wisdom
to turn to the sea for security have invariably bean able to
prevail over their land-power rivals*
The rolfc of the United States foavy is increasingly important.
The sisc of the navy's task and the tools with which it will work
will va;y with the changing world situation, aa well as with
technological devclopnents* The aise of the task and the nature
of the tools during any given period will depend upon many factors,
which aret
1. The will of the people of I • nited States to retain
their position as a world power*
2. United States reliance upon overseas sources of raw
materials*
3* The nature and number of United States overeeae politi-
cal and military coranitments*
U. The nature and extent of a prevailing threat to the
security of the United States*
5* The influence of new developments in weapons on taotios
of naval power*
To attain a clearer understanding of the effect which the
foregoing factors will have upon the future role of the Navy,
each will be considered separately*
*orld power* Today, the United states has aosmwsd the
responsibility of free world leadership, a responsibility which
we did not seek but which is bestowed upon us as the greatest
power of the free world emerging from «orld war ii» To under-
stand the meaning of this power and ita influence upon other
nations, it is first necessary to consider our geographical
position* I study of uhc lobe reveals ,hat about ?u percent
is water* •• • uch of the land area consists of deserts, moun-
tain areas, and wastelands, which are not suited to support largo
populations. The moot populous areas of the earth are, first
uroue and Western Asia; second, f astern Asia] third, India*
fourth, tne United Stateaj and fifth, Japan* Since international
relatione are relations between groups oi people, moot of our
major problems in this field arise in our dealings with these
heavily populated areas, all of which are readily accessible to
the United Statea by way of the
The common bond of the seas connecting the United '.tat.es
with her many friends and allies around the world is a powerful
it bm
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force which has bean a source of understanding among the maritime
nations of the world for many centuries. *<ith very few excep-
tions today, wherever the land touches the sea, the United States
has friends and allies* It is evident that every Important inter-
national decision we have made since the end of orld • ar XX is
based on the assumption that we can and will maintain control of
the seas. In other words, though not specifically stated as such,
the United tates in her actions is pursuing a national policy
based on maintaining control of the seas* The majority of the
maritime nations have signed mutual defense pacts with the United
' tes* ven though many of these nations are situate©, in posi-
tions exposed to Soviet attack, all signed the pacts with the feel-
ing that they were bound to us, rather than separatea free us,
by the seas* And in so signing, each nation staked its future on
the ability and intention of the United -tates to maintain its
position as a leading world power* This position of world power
cannot be maintained unless we continue to maintain the ability
to dominate worldwide sea communications* • . •
Reliance upon raw materials* ><hile ^orld V.ar II left the
United 'tates In the position of a great world power, the
was also a substantial drain on our own natural resources*
Great scientific and technological advances which are being made
in all areas of research are placing new demands on raw materials
which either do not exist in this country or are becoming in short
supply, /-or these reasons the United States, relatively self-
sufficient in agricultural produce is rapidly becoming a 'have
not" nation* »Ve are forced to import from all parts of the world
from 25 to 100 percent of each of over $0 essential raw materials
ranging from asbestos to sine* It is the Navy' s responsibility
to provide for the security of our worldwide overseas trade, and
so maintain our essential war industries as well as the war efforts
of our allies* with our worldwide sea communications secured,
the world stands with usj without them, we stand alone*
Overseas comultments* The Navy 1 s future responsibilities
will also be dependent upon the number and nature of United States
overseas oomuitments* An estimate of our future obligations can
be based on our present pledges* Today the United states is bound
by mutual uefense treaties to k2 nations, comprising 60O million
people on six continents across the world's -;;ajor oceans* besides
the mutual defense treaties, we are bound by no less stringent
ties to an additional 20 nations with nearly half the total pop-
ulation and approximately half the total land area of the earth*
All of these lie across the oceans from the United states* ».e
have caftiaitted large portions of our military forces and resources
to Western urope, the Mediterranean basin, and the Western Pacific
in order to assist £re9 peoples of the world to defend themselves
against possible Communist aggression* The United states, in addi-






comers of the free world. It will be necessary to continue our
overseas commitments, tremendous as they tare, in the foreseeable
future*
The United States has made these political and military
lents aa much in its can interest as In that of its allies.
For it is our allies who will eventually res ore the balance of
power in Europe and Asia****
The Navy ia responsible for sustaining and providing for the
security of the many contingente of the Army (in 73 countries; and
Air force stationed oversees* stationing of land forces overseas
in peacetime presupposes that they can be sustained and supported
by sea from the day a war begins—not a week or a month later*
This is s D-day responsibility of the aavy. Unless logistic
support can get through to them* and unless their positions can
be secured, our forces must eventually withdraw from their over-
seas positions or face destruction* The same ia true of any other
commitment* If the Navy ia unable to maintain control of the
water leading to, or adjacent to, critical areas of the globs*
any forces which we have in such areas will be in serious difficulty*
Responsibilities of ths Navy toward any
of the future ray be illustrated by our current commitments in
western Europe alone* In order for the Army and Air Force to
fulfill their missions in Western Furope, the Navy must be prepared
to perform three broad tasks in the event of war* First, the Navy
runt continue to r aintain sea communications to Eastern r urope*
In order to accomplish this, enemy submarines, sireraft, surface
craft, and other weapons which can be used against our convoys
must be repelled or destroyed* namy bases from which these
weapons can op rate must be neutralised* Second, the Navy must
provide combat support to U* 3. and allied land forces* This com-
bat support includes air, missile, and gunfire support. It includes
landing of Army and Air Force where and when they are required*
It includes the capability of bringing them off the beach when
required—not as refugees, but aa organised fighting unite* ex-
perience in Korea reemphasised the fact that, in order for any
army to conduct successful combat operations overseas, adequate
naval forces must be in a position to supply it, support it, and
secure its flanks* Before we can do this, we must have the sees
under our control* i'his will be aa true in any future war aa it
has been in the past. Third, the Navy must deny to ths enemy
areas essential to hie operations* If an enemy is permitted to
use the -altic and Norwegian Seas unmolested, our »estem burope
position will be outflanked from the north, and ngland will
become untenable* Therefore, in order to protect the Northern
Bv*emean flank, shipping, naval forces, and aircraft, which an
enemy employs to exploit these sees, must be neutralised or des-
troyed. This will include neutralisation of bases from which
I H •' .- "
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enemy forces operate* Unless m ene®y*s ability to use the
Aegean Sea. astern editerranean, and Adriatic Sea is denied,
our European position will events Uy be outflanked from the
outh*
For each overseas comoltnent made by the United States, the
Mtfvy has certain definite responsibilities* The Havy must supply
and support it, and must protect it from overseas attack by an
enemy* It is evident that current fcavy overseas responsibilities
are considerable and cannot be expected to decrease*
As our allies regain their strength and the balance of
is restored on the perimetera of urope and Asia* it can be anti-
cipated that our forces and baae facilities on foreign soil sill
gradually be reduced* As this occurs, the Influence exerted by
our mobile naval forces stationed in international eaters in stra-
tegically jjuportant areas of the globe will be vitally important
to our continued security. Hich forces, equipped with the latest
weapons—including atomic weapons, new aircraft, and ballistic
missiles—and maintained in the highest state of readiness, can be
a stabilising Influence around the globe ... .
Hie threat to pur security. In order to analyse the extent
and nature of the military threat to HM security of the Hnited
States, we must again consider our geographical position. •• •
To the north lies a traditionally friendly nation and beyond that
a vast Arctic wilderness. To the south are other friendly neigh-
bors* It becomes evident that the security advantages afforded
us by our fortunate geographic position can be matched by no other
major nation or center of population* Those who would attack us
ust first cross the seas or the Arctic barrier* These great
frontier areas have traditionally been formidable natural barriers
to any enemy of the United states, but in this age of great tech-
nical progress they can lose their value rapidly unless we main-
tain the will and wisdom to control them by constant adaptation
to scientific and technical advances. •• •
Sew developments* ^'he decisive nature: of naval power will
increase t»lth new developments in tactics and weapons* nations
have for many years struggled with the problem of gaining control
of the sea for themselves, or of denying it to their enemies*
seasons and tactics have been many and ingenious* Some ef these
have posed capabilities which threatened to make the cost of con-
trolling and using the sealanes prohibitively high* iJut more often
than not, as new weapons have been developed, they have boon adap-
ted to shipboard use, facilitating control and use of the sea*
The gun, mine, torpedo, and airplane have been used with great
effectiveness to gain control of the sea after each, in its turn,
as credited with capabilities to deny the seas to those who





seas appear to be the airplane, the submarine, and the .inej
tomo row, it ay bs southing else, with atonic weapons and
tlistic Elssiica, it requires little taf appreciate
tremendous possibilities of weapons such as these intelligently
applied to the problem of eoncrolling and using the seas*
.
» •
The liavy e will have at its disposal weapon*
and techniques which will tsake it an even greater doninatlng
force than it has been in the past* lew weapon.^, including
atomic weapons and ballistic missiles, and new techniques will
enable Avy to conduc need effectiveness amphibious
warfare, naval air warfare, sutaarine warfare, antisubmarine
fare, and other types • •• which seaborne forces are
Research in hull propulsion design is also opening up new
vistas which are yet to be fully explored* 'Jnits on slas and
uses of ships are not yet in sight* ince the first ator
submarine, H comienced operations in IS'55, the Mavy»s
revolution in ship design has taken on new impetus* This sub-
marine has now become an active unit of the fleet, and the out-
standing success of its revolutionary nuclear propulsion aystem
is comparable to the change from sail to steam in the last cen-
tury* as our experience in construction of nuclear-powered ships
eases, the time required to build them, as well as their cost,
will become progressively less, it ia od to iricorporete
nuclear propulsion systems In the mwjoe portion of mew submarine
construct! ., in few years, to extend it to guided
missile cruisers, frigates, and aircraft carriers* ft is
probable that moat combatant ships will ultimately be atoruio
powered* V.ith the a .dition of the PMkSTAL" class attack carrier
to the fleet and continuing i -..eat in preeent capability of
carrier-based jet aircraft to deliver atomic weapons, the increase
in striking power of the Wavy is incalculable*
III. RATICHAl SKCURITY ACT AND MOTH*" PAr^ilS
Essential references for defining the roles and missions of the
Navy ere incorporated in the following sources
i
1. National totality Act of 19U7, as amended to August 31, 19$6.
2. "Functions of the Armed forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,"
Ootober 1, 1953* a directive of the Secretary of Defense*
3« "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the ffective-
ness of Operation of the bepartm«nt of Defense," November 26, 1?56, a
:ie»/j
11*
moaoranrtnm by the >ecretar/ of Defense to the Anted Faroes Folic/
Council*
Theee documents represent fundamental polio/ planning in the
assignments of specific tasks to the varioae military services, 'arte
of these dosisasnts are quoted for a better understanding of the
specific responsibilities assigned to the £avy*
i ..-.-w-i.o;-^l i-jar.y Act 2l V*? « & act defines U* .-oparvient tl
the Kovy as follows
t
I. 20©. (a) The terra "Department of the Hsvy as used in
this act shall be construed to mean the Department of the «»svy
at the seat of goventaent) the headquarters. United States
Marine Corps} the entire operating forces of the United States
Navy, including naval sanation, ana of the United States Marine
Corps, including the reserve components of such forces) all
field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations,
activities, and functions under the control or supervision of
the Department of the Uavyj and the United States Coast Guard
operating aa a part of the Navy pursuant to law*
Subparagraphs (o) and (o) were repealed and substituted by the
h
following current provisions:
(10 MB* 9)12. United States ».avyj composition;
functions
(a) The Navy, within the Department of the bavy, includes,
in general, naval combat and service:-, forces and such aviation
as :*y be organic therein* The Navy shall be organised, trained,
and equipped primarily for operations at sea. It is responsibls
for the preparation of naval forces necesssry for the effective
preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution
of war except aa otherwise assigned and is generally responsible
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IS
(b) AH naval aviation shall be integrated islth the naval
service as ->,»rt thereof ithin the i)ep«rtmerit of the i*evy. Kaval
aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and
Includes land-based liavai aviation, air transport essential for
naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved
in the operations and activities of the kavy, and the entire
re r of the aeronautical organisation of the Uavy, together
with the personnel necessary tnerefor.
(q) The b&vy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics,
technique, organization, and equipment of naval comoat and ser-
vice elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions
shall be coordinated between ths Army, the Air > orce, and the
Navy.
(d) ;he fcavy is responsible, in accordance with integrated
joint aobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime
components of the tigry to meet the needs of war.
"functions of thv_ Armed lorces and the Joint Chiefs of taff,
October 1, 1953
»
imi V--runctions of the United States Navy and -Sarins
Corps
within the DepsrtKxeat of the Navy, assigned forces include
the entire operating forces of the ' nited States Navy, including
naval aviation, and the United states 'ferine Corps. These forces
are organised, trained, and equipped primarily ior prompt and
sustained combat operations at sea, and for air and land operations
incident thereto. Of the three major services, the «avy has
primary interest in all operations at sea, except in those
operations otherwise assigned herein.
A. iTiisary functions
1. To organise, train, and equip havy and arine rorces
for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea,
including operations of sea-based aircraft and their land-based
naval air components. >speci lieallyt
(a) To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces
and to suppress enemy sea commerce*
(b) To ,.ain and ii>aintain general sea supremacy.
(c) To control vital sea areas and to protect







establish and maintain local superiority
(including air; in an area of naval operations.
(e; To SSlM and defend advanced naval bases and
to conduct such i*nd operations as stay be essential to the pro-
secution of a naval campaign.
2* To conduct air operations as necessary for the
accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign*
3. To organise and equip, in coordination with the
other services, and to provide naval forces, including naval
close air-support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious
operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of
all forces as assigned for joint amphibious operations in accord-
ance with the policies arid doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*
km To develop, in coordination with the other services,
the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for
amphibious operations, and the doctrines and procedures for joint
amphibious operations*
5. To furnish adequate, timely and reliable intelli-
gence for the UmVty and arine Corps*
6. To be responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-
submarine warfare, the protection of shipping, and for mine lay-
ing, including the air aspects thereof, and controlled mine field
operations*
7* To provide air support essential for naval operations*
8* To provide sea-based air defense and the sea-based
means for coordinating control for defense against air attack,
coordinating with the other services in matters of Joint concern*
9* To provide naval (including naval air) forces as
required for the defense of the United States against air attack,
in accordance with Joint doctrines and procedures approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff*
10* To furnish aerial photography as necessary for
naval and 'arine Corps operations*
11. (Pertains solely to the murine Corps*)
o* Collateral functions
The forces developed and trained to perforci the prisaary func-
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the other services in carrying out their primary functions, where
and whenever 3uch parti ien will result in increased effective-
ness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-ell
military objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the ser-
vice having primary responsibility for a function s all be the
agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the
requirements and plans for the employment of all forces to carry
out the function* He shall also as responsiol* for presenting
to the Joint Chiefs of 3taf 1 for final mmttston any disagreement
within the field of his primary responsibility which has not been
resolved, ;Ms shall not be constraed to prevent any member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any ismie of
disagreement with another service* Certs!, specific collateral
functions of the Navy and arine Corps are listed below:
1. To interdict enemy land and air power and eeemuni-
cations through operation at sea*
2. To conduct close sir support for land operations*
3* To furnish aerial photography for cartographic
purposes*
U» To be prepared to participate in the over-all air
effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of ^taff*
"Clarification of ftoles ..rid Missions to Improve the ffectivenema
of operations of the Depart.cnt of - efense, " This report to the
members of the Armed Forces olicy Council clariiied the following
iisslonst
1* Use of aircraft by the • • Arcy*
2. Adequacy of Airlift*
3. Air defense*
h. Air orce tactical support of the Army*
5* Intermediate range ballistic missiles*
Sections in which the Navy is specifically mentioned ares
3. (c). The Navy, in clos« coordination with the Army and Air
jrce, is assigned responsibility for the development, procure-
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the accomplishment of its assigned functions*
(e). In overseas areas ••• .avy forces should continue to
be responsible for tfieir own air defense t sea, employing, organic
neans, As approved by the theater OSJensnder, Um air component
cor.i ander should establish such procedures for coordinating Army,
%avy, and /ir orce air defense forces as may be required to carry
out his responsibilities, and, in addition, should establish such
detailed procedures as are necessary for proper coordination with
national air defense commanders of allied countri< ,
*>• (b). Operational employment of the ship-based intermediate
range ballistic missile system will be the sole responsibility of
tht , . Navy.
In st&uaary, the &avy*s mission, that of control of the seas, must
be understood in teriS of the national strategy of the United I tates
and the collective desires of the American people. The igry is respon-
sible for executing their wishes, maintaining the degree or amount of
sea power they decide upon as an expression of national strategy*
Congress has delegated specific tasks or functions to the liavy
through the National Security Act of 19U7 which were further clarified
•y the Secretary of defense in IfU and again in 19>6.
This background material has been presented here as n aid to the
reader in understanding the nature of problems and principles involved
in the survey design, analysis, and conclusions discussed in the remain-








l*nersl* A descriptive survey was utilised in order to obtain
sapirical oata on which to build the plan of education* The purpose
or general objective of the survey was to determine, through scientific
research technicues, how well the concept of ''mission" and the term
"capabilities" are understood by personnel in the Navy*
Specific objectives* A list of nine specific objectives was
developed to serve as analytical aids in clarifying the general objec-
tive. They were?
1, To deterrdne the degree of understanding of "mission" and
"capabilities" on the part of officers and enlisted men.
2* To determine the level of factual knowledge in these areas
from an awareness of current events pertaining to naval affairs*
3* To assemble data on opinions of naval personnel in regard
to public recognition of the Kavy»s Importance*
U* To assemble data on opinions of naval personnel as to the
most effective weapons*
£• To examine interest-attitudes of naval personnel in these
areas in order to arrive at an indication of motivation to learn*







7* to gather oata on reading habits of personnel in these areas*
• To assemble data on opinions of the adequacy of information
in these areas*
9* To assemble ideas and preferences for training taetnoas to be
utilized in expanding oresent educational practices*
ethodology . A number of raestions relating to the scope and
methodology had to be decided upon before proceeding with the survey*
These were discussed in detail with various members of the teaoMnf
staff at iJoston University whose concurrence was received. The more
important of these were:
** E ^,Q of sample* The sample sise of 200 was arbitrarily selected
by the writer to represent the approximately 670,000 officers and
men on active duty in the Havy. The officer portion was arbitrarily
set at £0 to represent the 70,000 officers while the number of enlisted
was set at 150 to represent the 600,000 enlisted sen* ithin these
sise limits the designed .attribution of each group (by rank and pay
structure) was arrived at by percentage distribution in accord-
a official personnel strength figures as of irebruary 23, ly!?7«
'•'• xcluslons from the sampls* In order to reduce somewhat x-he
Tiber of subgroups it was decided that no Marines, ftAfJiS, nurses, or
students unver instruction would be included in the officer group.
Exclusions in the enlisted group were: v.AV',8, men being processed for
separation from the Navy, and en in a disciplinary status*
3* Method of data collection* The method of data collection was





be the >ost appropriate eans of gathering data* The questionnaire
ared to be the oet feasible for this study oie to the savings in
ti Ml and expense with the additional advantage of allowing aceuraulation
of a greater quantity of data in the time allotted for tha study,
lata collected And reported herein includes core than 12f i*X) items
of information.
XI, B STICfc<AIh TRUGTIOW
After the specific objectives were drawn up and decided upon a
large number of questions were constructed to obtain data relevant
to t*ch objective. The questionnaire was submitted to thraa professors,
five naval reservist officers, and other graduate students for face
validity checks and comments, yany suggestions for additional questions
83 well as deletions of seme were received and incorporated into the
instrument. This development and refining process took several months
of research and coordination.
The sane questionnaire nas used for both officers and enlisted
men which necessitated a certain amount of compromise in style and
••pltodLty of wording in order to reach the lowest and highest denom-
inator of education level. Various cross-cheeks on truthfulness (valid-
ity checks) in answering questions were built into the instrument.
III. m - STICKS BIB
The pretest was conducted with nine enlisted men randomly selected
from transient .nrao;; el in the same place and in the same manner that
•4
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the final ample would be selected. Tkm writer supervised tha comple-
tion of the pretest. .iotuiaires and interviewed the respondents
after they had turned In the complc ted forms. In this manner the
individual questions were further refined and son* unnecessary questions
deleted*
IV. MTA Cu Vm
A number of problems in regard to detail were encountered in s* lect-
in£ the sampl and administering tha questionnaires* General consider-
ations included such problems as keeping a balance in distribution
factors, such as*, ship personnel vs. shore-based personnel! foreign
service vs. no-foreign service; new recruits vs. old-timers; and special-
ists vs. general uty personnel. Selection of these factors were further
complicated by the ratios of each rank and rate (pay grade) level.
fficer portion. This part of the sample was rando ily selected
from nane rosters of approximately 110 navnl activities and commands
1
within the First Naval District. Percentage distribution by rank
categories was computed from official Navy personnel figures, for the
2
entire Navy, as of February 2d, lv57» These percentages were than
applied in computing the sample categories.
Questionnaires were raailed out to officers 100 per cent in excess
ee Appendix ii for a complete list of naval commands represented
in the officer sample.
2
:<avy and Marine Corps illtary 'ersonnel tatistice, eiAV Pitts






Of desired quota in order to allow for tha asual high percentage of
no-returns. Legal officers at the i'lrat Naval District saw no objec-
tion to using official franked aail for outgoing and return of mes-
tionnelres. All mail questionnaires were turned ewer immediately to
the writer upon receipt at the District Public Information Office.
nllated portion. This group was randomly selected fron transient
personnel reporting for further assignment to the l« S. Kaval Ireceiving
Station, Boston. Distribution by pay grades of the fcavy's total person-
nel structure was computed in a manner similar to the officer ^roup and
applied to the selection of the enlisted portion. Special categories
were eliminated from the sample based upon conference discussions and
interest-attitude levels demonstrated in the pretest. These worst
1. Man in a disciplinary status of prisoners waiting legal action.
2. Men waiting to be separated from the Navy.
3. Hen rehabilitated recently in retraining cai.oands as s result
of serious offenses.
The enlisted portion was scheduled for completing the luestionnaires
as part of their in-transit processing at the receiving station. Mo




3URV * AliALTSIS AMD PRfiSJOiTATI * OF RESULTS
The analysis of data obtained in this survey **• organised in a
manner to obtai . as sauoh useful information fraa the art.ua/ as possible,
all of it in relation to the general and specific objectives listed in
Chapter ill* uotiiug procedure ana tabulating of responses are included
in Part I of this chapter as the first steps in the analysis* fbe dis-
cussion of results in art II of this chapter follow the general format
of the questionnaire! face sheet data, questions on mission, questions
on capabilities, »nd questions on sources of information*
odlng* Uuilding of the code was started after the first croup
of completed questionnaires was received* About 30 questionnaires
were analysed to determine the pattern of responses and for» of word-
phrase groups appearing raost frequently in responses to open end ques-
tions* ach possible question response was j;iven a separate colucn
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to column headings on accounting work paper {Ik x 31 inches ) containing
30 major columns each of which contained seven smaller colu&ns. -ore
than 12, UX) items of information were tabulated in this banner iron
the 63 questions asked of each respondent* After all questionnaires
were cooed ssjti tabulated, the columns were added up and percentage*
•frx>9 lo
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computed for use later In the analysis*
II. PRHaHWTATICN OF RESULTS
Findings of the surrey will be presented here In six parts*.
1* Re-evaluation of specific objectives*
2. Characteristics of the sample.
3* Discussion of responses to questions on "mission*
*
u* Discussion of responses to questions on "capabilities*
"
!?• ources of information reported by the sample.
»
-evaluation of original specific objectives . The analysis was
developed in relationship to the specific objectives outlined in Chapter
III* edifications of preliminary objectives were required during
the course of the study due to the doubtful value of subgroup analysis
within the officer and enlisted personnel structures. It was apparent,
after a study of present training programs, that any attempt to deter-
mine specific ranks and rate levels for more training in these areas
was a theoretical Matter and would not justify the cost nd additional
tine required to break down each response into the twelve pay-grade
subgroups* fforts were made originally to study such related vari-
ables as: experience in the Navy, education, and major field of study
for their effect on information attitude levels. Such an analysis was,
however, determined to be of an analytical nature beyond the scope of
the immediate study, "cme of the reasons for this decision were: the
small sample on which to base specific findings, difficulty in establish-
ing criteria for these levels, and the time and expense limitation
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which would not .t use of IBM punch cards for tabulating data.
Instead, tabulatin, was limited to the two major personnel categories,
officers and enlisted r.on, in such a manner that each was a complete
study or "profile" in itself. Then, the two were auded together to
arrive at a composite picture of what naval personnel know (facts) and
what they think (opinions) they know about the :,avy*a misalon and
capabilities* The bulk of the analysis is presented in comparative
table fors. with responses converted into percentage figures for ease
in studying relationships*
Characteristics of the sample * The final sample included k9
officers and 117 enlisted men as compared to the 50 officers and 1!#
men originally planned* > y eduction in the sample else was due to an
unanticipated reduction in transient personnel oelng processed at the
U. B« Naval Receiving Station, ioston, during the period June 10,
through June ?1, 195»7. The time period available for conducting this
study would not perai* an extension of this portion of the survey*
Nevertheless the sample is considered to be a fair representation of
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Chief eetty Officers 8.1
Petty Officers lirst Class U.6
" " Second Class 10.3
M Third Class 20.2
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Hi
listed portion of the final sample was not as high aa originally
planned. This was due to a low level input into t> e U. 5. ftava}
reiving Station, Boston, during the two weeks available for gathering
data. Ml enlisted rating groups were represented in the sample except:









The final officer portion of the maple represented k? cauaanus
1
based ashore and five based afloat* se U>.~* per cent were in
the reserve forces while 51.1 per cent were in the regular Havy. This
distribution compares favorably with the acual distribution in the
avj which is iuU.2 per cent in the reserves and 55.8 per cent regulara.


















iotal ~ i& ~ 100m luu.Q
Age distribution of officers was 20.U per oent in each five year
category fro 20 to 3h years and }%S per cent over 35 years old, ">f
these respondents, 53.1 per cent indicated they were in the Navy on
a career basis while 38.7 per cent indicated it was only a temporary
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Ses Appendix I for a list of naval ccaraands represented in the
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avy a career.
Service overseas since World war II »as considered to be signifi-
cant in a man's understanding of the Navy's mission* Results of a
question on this item indicated -.hat 75*5 p*r cent of officers and
only 1)6*2 per cent of enlisted had performed duty overseas in the period
nanticried*
ducation distribution among officers questioned indicated that
ii6*9 per cent were college graduates and another 12*2 pmr cent had
done postgraduate work* The study of courses in engineering was the
nost predominate: (26*5%) major field of study* Arts (21*#5>). sciences
(ld*l#), and business (12*2*, were the next nost common study areas.
It was also found tha t 75*5 per cent of the offleer group was
married and 63*3 p<r cent had children. Jost of the officers (71*1^)
esne from the oast coast of the United States, and listed their
fathers' occupations in the "skilled" category (26.6a). The next
highest occupation of the father was in the professional category
(22*££) with the balance (U8*9£) divided evenly between administrative-
nenagenent. snail business owner, white collar; and unskilled.
ture career time remaining far these officers showed that 26*$
per cent were expecting to be released from active duty within a year*
The next largest group. 2U*5 per cent, were those 1th 10 or more years
remaining before retirement*
The enlisted men appearing in the sample varied from the officer
group in a number of these characteristics* Generally, they were
younger (i49.7A> were under 20 years of age compared to no officers
ni
';) I'Mnil .•:. Mb It
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in hat age group;, had seen less active duty (26.J& had been on active
duty less than a year;, and fewer decided to ake it a career (i*J.i^
said "no" to career possibilities)* It was noted .hat a significantly
fewer number of enlisted had served overseas (1*6.2^) compared to the
officer group (?£•£/£) and none had graduated from collage. The number
of married enlisted (3U«2» was less than half of the officers who
were married. ' ocio-economic level of the enlisted group was Indicated
by the fact that 69»2 per cent listed their fathers 1 occupations in the
"skilled," "semi-skilled," and "unskilled" categories. Those expecting
to get out of the Navy within a year were about half the officer group
althcra. h 1x7*0 per cent of the enlisted group expected to be out of the
Navy within four years.
ponseg to questions on mission. s stated earlier, the general
objective of t he survey was to attempt to measure how well the concept
of mission is understood by people in the fravy. It must be realised
that no exact measure ent can be ads of such a broad area of know*
ledge. The best that can be done is to infer the degree or amount
of understanding a person has from the responses he gives to a series
of fact and opinion questions related to the general topic. r>uch a
re wss followed in constructing questions to be submitted to
,b in this survey.
The questionnaire took several r.onths to develop and a large vol-
ume of printed material wss screened for ideas to be incorporated
into the test instrument. Only those items were used, with one excep-













available to all persons in the Navy.
Related closely to knowledge level and of concern la this type of
study is the interest-attitude a nan has in learning about the broader
aspects of his life in the Navy* villi ha saak out infomation on the
mission or must he be exposed to it entirely separate from his own
initiative? How must ha learn about these Batters' Mure precisely*
now much motivation doss he exhibit -toward this knowledge area?
?he thirteen questions used to iM—re this area can be grouped
roughly into fact, opinion, and interest-attitude categories*
The first fact -uestion: "'s far as you know, did the Navy take
any action in the Israeli-, gyptian crisis'' " was designed to measure
knowledge level on current affairs involving the Navy. The fact that
the Navy evacuated American citizens during the crisis period was widely
publicist d in civilian news media channels and especially in service
newspapers and magasines* Other Navy action in th£ crisis period
included placing ships in a higher state of readiness, addition of
several fl*et units, and concentration of the ; ixth FXeat in the
eastern area of the Mediterranean, •'he following table indicates
survey responses to this question:
Itup
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it km a turn n larai
otal
Officers nlisted •at .le
response a . i
vacuated . . citisen* 27.7 17.9 21.3
Stand-by l readiness) 32.3 10.6 18.1
horaed strength 26.2 9.7 •U
Took no action u.6 U3.1 29.8
trengthened fleet «*6 — 1.6
Don't know — 13.0 M
ho answer W 5.7 5.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Of si#iificanco is the high number of enlisted men (li3.lv who
said the Navy did not take any action. The ndon't know" enlisted group
is also high in proportion to the officer group.
st'cond knowledge-level fact question was on the meaning of the
abbreviations "NATO" and "S ATO, " the two ;ajor military alliance pacts
betseen the nnited States and other free nations. NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty organization; is the Atlantic allianc $ and 9laf0 (.oath Last
Asia Treaty Organization) is the Pacific defense pact. Results of












iiox IATO 96.0 u7.9 62.6
Know 83.6 19.7 38.6
l)on»t know NATO — 35.9 25.3
Don«t know Ul 58.9 bh.0
No answer Mi 2.0 16.2 12.0
No answer * .:- 21.U 17.5
total 200.0 "* 2t , 2i ,
—
.
Note* Two questions were asked so data was compiled on the
basis of 200£«
The table illustrates a Tory significant difference between groups
on this question, in® drop in knowledge percentage on lAfO by enlisted
flsan was slightly more than 50 per cent, and for MafQ there was a drop
of almost 6k per cent. The "don't knows" and "no answers" were very
high in the enlisted group also.
I our questions in the section on xaission wars designed to neasurs
opinions. Two asked respondents what they thought wore the
2
far keeping the Jixth *!•*% in the Mediterranean and the eventh ileet
in the Fonaosa area. The third asked v.hat they thought was the Navy 1 a
role in air defense of the United States, and the fourth was the
2
Arleigh I* Burke, Admiral, USN, said, in a discussion on the
problejn in the Mediterranean, "Our mission would be to protect U. •
lives and property first... fthat happens other than that is dependent
upon what our own government decides we should do." "Ik-Boob Cannot
Wipe Out the U. B. Kavy," U. 5. Keww and v.orld Report, lay U» 1956,
p. 88.
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crucial question—to state the „avy' » mission. The first two of these
questions Kill be grouped together in discussion and table even though
the Sixth Fleet question was open-end and the Seventh Meet question
was closed-end. Table V shows the responses to these questions*
TABLE V
RBASCMS FOR KABTAXKINQ 6TH AND 7TH




Prevent aggressio —stop spread
of Corarainisw 19.6 9.0 13.1
Show strength 15.2 12.3 13.1
Goodwill toward Allies 12.0 9.0 10.1
.
>roximity to ares in case of
trouble 10,7 6.S .
Readiness if needed 10.7 lh.9 13.U
Keep peace 8.7 11.6 lw.5









Slow spread of Cc&niuniaxi
South rest Asia Si.u 3a.u hh.l
Halt Communist attack on MM! 37.0 36.8 36.9
Prevent Nationalists from attack-
ing the Mainland 3.7 ld.it lh.0
Other M li.8 3.3
Don't know — — mm
No answer 1.9 1.6 1.7
Total 100.0 100,0 100.0
,:,
"—"'
Includes a number of niscellaneous
considered to be significant.






The results shown above indicate ore 01 a consistency
than, was found in cost of the other responses* This fact is
interesting to note where the difference in overseas Out/—i'iret-hand
experience with the Kavy's mission—was so great* In the officer group
75*5 per oent had served overseas compared to the u6*2 per cent of en-
listed raen* The higher proportion of "don't knows" and "no answers"
to the dxth ;• lcet question was probably due to the open-end type of
question.
The third question in the opinion ares was: "^hat do you think the
Navy* 8 job is in the air defense of the United States'?" Generally,
the Navy's role in this area is in the seaward extensions of the radar
warning network surrounding the United states* The Navy 1 a task is to
extend the Dllf line (i/lstant larly Warning) and other8 by use of ocean
3
station radar ships* The avy's area of Interception of enemy planes







NATO'S OP THF UNITiO) ST/
LI
Officers filiated a**" - ^1 f-
-ode category ,
Radar warning 31.U 16.9 21.6
Interception of aircraft 31.14 17.6 22.3
Support Continental Air efenee
Uemaand (OGNAD) M .7 3.U
Support Air Force 5.7 .7 2.1i
..-iter Attack 2.9 bOi 3.9
)ff-shore patrol l.u . 6.3
Snail importance 2.9 .7 US
Medium importance 1.U — .5
Great importance l.U 6.6 U9
Others U3 U.U u.U
Don't know Uk 19.2 13.1
No answer 7.2 20.0 15.5
Total 100.0 loo.o loo.o
Of significance here is the Itf per cant (approximate) enlisted
group in the "don't know" and "no answer" categories compared to the
nine per cent of officers, '"cue confusion in question meaning may
havw ooctured aa evidenced by respondents' evaluation of job impor-
tance instead of stating what the role was in air defense.
The most crucial question in the opinion area was the one asking
respondents to state the Navy's mission in their own words. Respond-
ents gave a great variety of statements in their answers to this ques-
tion. Twenty-six word-phrase categories wars used to cods these
statements. Major categories in which each group gave answers are
tabulated in the following tablet
.•
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Uocie Category .- .
Control of the seat . .3
Defend the United States d.o 13.1 U.7
Aid Allies 6,3 6.2 7.3
; rovide logistic support 5.9 Iu5 5.2
Air attack frotu carriers ., 2.6 3.9
Take offensive acti n 5.5 3.1; M
Readiness to fight 5.1 5.2 $.2
Keep sea lanes open U.6 3.1
Land U. B* forces U.6 3.1» U.o
Deter aggression and keep peace 3.0 6.0 U6
Maintain goodwill for nited




Don*t know — 4.1 2.2
9 JW
1' 2,1 7.9 5.2
Total 100.0 100,0 100,0
Note: I4I4 officers, or 89.0%, gave answers In 2 or wore categories*
62 enlisted, or 53.0^, " MM
floth groups were fairly consistent in their types of answers in
the above table with relatively few in the "do^t know" and "no answei
categories. Of significance is the lack of high percentages in any
category. Highest categories were; for officers, "control of the
•ass" (3.8*) and for enlisted, "defend the U.S." (13.L-J. question
wording, wherein the Instruction was: "l/iscuss (mis ion) in detail
as to roles, functions, rasponsibilitiee, jobs, etc. r'ltsse do not
say just 'control of the seas 1 ," probably accounted for the low
numbers in this category. Also of significance is the low percentage








*Analysts of this question offers an opportunity for a number of
statistical analyses and correlations on frequencies, relationships
of variable s of education, time in wavy, .socioeconomic level, etc.,
all of which are beyond the Immediate scope of this study*
In the intereat-&ttitufle or motivational area of learning more
about the Nayy's Mission the following six questions were asked:
1* Bo you feel you have a good understanding oi the mission of
the three military services
2* Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy's mission
or not°
3» »'Ould you like to know more about the Navy's mission or not
U. Do you feel the liavy is telling you enough about its mission?
5. How do you think the part the Navy now plays compares with
that of World ?>ar II
6. ««hat changes, if any, have the nation's leaders shown recently
in their attitudes about the importance of the Navy in a future conflict?
7. If you feel the Navy is receiving sufficient public recogni-
tion for the job it is doing in the Mediterranean''
ach of these questions was of the closed-end type. The first four
will be discussed together because of the similarity of subject matter*
Of )rime importance in developing a study plan on the mission and
capability of the Navy is to learn something about the level of motiva-
tion people have for learning subject matter in this field. The best
way for dtyWaining this seemed to be to ask them. Heavy reliance,
of course, must to made on honest answers, so in order to facilitate
this, the question aires were kept anonymous. Table VIII presents
I I





respondents 1 answers to these four questions.
TABL£ VIII
INTHRSST-ATinUDE QUSSTI3J RfiSPO.
AN £< N FOR L-AHHI40
frtal
utetions and officers Bnlisted tavplfl
Code Categories 1 i
1. Understanding fission of three
military services!
Have little understanding — U.3 3.0
••w™™ ^^^iws*^w ^wa*sw^ww*i **"mm^»»fc U6.9 62.U 57.8





2, Good understanding of Movyis
Biission or nots
lea 89.8 75.2 79.5
Ho U.1 6.8 6.0
Undecided U.1 17.1 13.3
No answer
Mat




the Navy's mission or notx
Yes 73.5 76.1 75.3
MO 18.3 16.2 16.9
No answer U.1 .9
Total
Opinion on whether Navy is
ioo.o 100.0 100 .0
14.
telling its people enough
about the Kdsslont
las 51.0 3U.2 39.2
.0 U2.9 59.0 5U.2
Don*t know — 3.U 2.U
No answer 6.1 3.U U.2
Total 100.0 loo.o 100.0
The significance of data in this table is prtsaarlly in the high




mission (90$) with fh per cent interested in learning still more about
the mission* The enlisted group indicated lose satisfaction with their
knowledge of the mission (75?) but showed a throe per cent higher
interest level to learn.
ostion No* k indicates that about half of the officers (51.0S-)
feel satisfied with the Navy's internal Information program in regard
to mission while enliated r.en indicated they were not as pleased with
the amount of information they receive. In other words, 6$.8 per cent
of enlisted would like more information on the Navy* a mission*
Of interest in this table is to explore the reasons for the differ-
ences in understanding the r ission of the three military aervices, the
spread botwom the two groups in the "some understanding" category being
15*5 pf^r cent* The nuestions hare seem to bo«
1* Do these figures represent respondents 1 true feelings or are
they the type of answers "expected" of then* In other words, were
respondents |jiving biased or true answers'
2* Of what effect is the respondent's frame of reference for
baaing his answer
It is apparent that neither of these questions can bo answered in this
analysis but are mentioned hero for the sake of recognising the li -
tations and a terminal point for this analysis*
The second group of three questions in the interest-attitude area
were desipied to measure respondents' evaluation of the worth, or
importance* of the Kavy generally. From this sort of analysis it seems
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uthe respondent places upon his own raeiabership In the group* tn this
sense then a greater public recognition for the Na*y moans greater
onal satisfaction for its embers. The results of these three











1. importance of the Navy* a role
















Total 100.0 100.0 loo.d
2. Attitude change of nation's
leaders toward importance
of the Ha?yt
Deoreaeed very ranch — 1.7 1*2
creased sons 10.2 19.6 16.9
3 change UU.3 13.7 13.9
Increased some 55.1 31*. 2 hPm U
Increased very much 16.3 26.5 23.5
Don't know — 1.7 1.2
Ho answer Ul 2.6 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0 lOO^O"
3. Sufficient recognition j;iven
to toavy for job in
Medlterraneani
Em AM 33.3 1*1.0
No 26.5 37.6 31*.!*
Undecided . 25.2 22.2
Don't know — — —
No answer 6.1 .9 2.1*









Results of fjuestion Ho. 1 in the table indicate that over half
of both groups gave the ^avy more importance today than In * orld 5«ar II.
nlisted men evaluated the Navy* 6 importance to be greater, by 15 per
cent, than did officers* Or conversely, twice as many officers as en-
listed felt that the Kavy was less important today. toughly only one-
fourth of both groups felt it had stayed at about the sane 1 vel of
importance.
Question rio. 2 responses indicated that about 10 per cent more
officers (total of two "increase" categories is 71.h/0 Mi that
there had been increased recognition of the Navy's importance by the
nation* s loaders. It is significant to note that exactly the same
percentage of officers (55.lv) felt that Ifg importance was "greater"
In question No. 1 as said the nation's leaders showed "soma increase"
in the importsnce-of-the-*iavy attitude in question No, 2. The enlisted
group favored the highest category of increase by 1 pm cent more
than the officer group and at the same tine marked more often in the
"decreased some" category by 9.U per cent. Higher markings in these
categories reduced the "increased some" by 20.9 per cent below the
ofiicers. valuation of this question would indicate the officer group
to be ore conservative in evaluations at both extremes of the continuum.
j.estion Ho. 3 indicates that more officers (26» than enlisted
feel satisfied that the Navy is receiving sufficient recognition for
the job it is doing in the 'Mediterranean. Additional significant infor-
mation is indicated in the "undecided" and "no answer" categories.
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valration of these three questions indicate that enlisted tuen
are more optidstic about tlM future IripQi-tance of the Uwry but, at the
same time, are doubtful of the public recognition U receiver. ;ffie«re
on the other hand are more pessimistic and conservative but believe
that s&or© recognition is given to the i*avy in the areas tested*
Reeponaos to question
a
on c&paollities* Seventeen questions were
designed to measure the second hali of the general objective of the
survey, the degree of understanding of the Uavy 1 s "capabilities." The
questions have been divided into three categories, as in the "mission"
section above, for discussion purposes* Groupings used were si ilar
—
fact, opinion, and interest-attitude categories.
The six fact questions designed to test knowledge levels in this
1. Since World *ar II a number of scientific developments here
increased the My*! power to wage » ar. Vhat are seme of these?
2. Do you happen to know how -any nuclear powered submarines the
Hevy has in service and under construction altogether" (Include those
Congress has appropriated funds for.;
3. how ruany submarines do you think aussia has''
km Ooes Hussia have any nuclear powered submarines?
£• m what country were the last amphibious landings made by the
t*avy under actual combat conditions^'
6. ««hat is the total distance the Havy 1 s newest carrier-based
planes can fly" (Total of the mileage out and back.)






ir: :,i',: i '.i 1..
Total
stions and Officers fcnlisted At
« Categories *
1. Seisntififl uevelopmcnts since
World «ar lit
Nuclear propulsion 26,2 13.U MU
Guided missiles 23,8 25.5 2U.8
ft aircraft 12.8 12.7 12.7
Nuclear weapon 7.5 6.0 6.6
Improved guns and fire
control systems, etc. 5.2 6.7 6.1
- ,a o U.7 2.6 3.U
Improved radar, sonar, etc* U.1 6.3 5.5
ier carriers 3.5 11.9 .
iasile ships 3.5 2.2 2.7
Rockets 2.9 1*9 U.1
,~;n<r 5.8 1.1 3.0
m%% know — 1.5 .9
No answer — . 3.2
.otal X .. ioo.o 100.0
2* isuclear submarines in service
and under construction:
3 subciarintos Hi.3 28.2 2li.l
6 suUasrines 36.? 17.1 22.9
9 2Q.U 18.8 19.U
12 8.2 k.3 5.U
15 n 8.2 iu3 5.U
18 —
. .6
21 " — 5.1 3.6
21, » — 1.7 1.2
Don't know 10.2 12.0 ll.it
Ho answer 2.0 7.7 ,















stions and Officers nlisted ! le
tods -nV'. SjrlSJ e
3. stiaiate of number of Russian
submarines*
^;d under 2.0 3.U 3.0
200 s ibmarines 12.3 5.1 7.2
300 " 10.2 k.3 6.0
35o 6.1 _ 1.8
100 " 26.6 6.8 12.7
U5o 14.3 3.k 6.
$00 8.2 6.0 6.6
600 " 2.u .6 1.2
More than 600 2.0 7.7 6.1
Uore than the United
States 2.0 5.1 U.2
Other — 2.6 ,.
Don't know 12.3 U2.8 33.8
Mo answer , 12.0 9.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
U. Does Russia have any nuclear
powered submarines ":
PH 4 38.5 29.5
Ho 77.5 35.9 U3.2
Don't know 10.2 20.5 17.5
No answer h.l .3 U8
,al ic , 1 .-.,": 100.6
%m Country where Nary oade last
amphibious landings in combat!
Korea 87.8 37.5 52.UMmh 2.0 3.i» 3.0
Two Jixaa MM 2.7 1.8
HkeV 2.0 fJk 7.2
Don't know k.l 29.1 21.7
Is answer k.l 17.9 u.









'ft X ( continued)
cations and .leers nlisted
.ode Categories % %



















16.3 47 .y 38.6
6.1 16. ! IS.1
Mo. 1 indicates the general level of awareness of .ajor
in ships, planes and armament which hare taken ^lace since the
aid of vorld ar IX. All officers in the saaple gave unwere in two
or mere categories. A similar check showed that 73.6 per cent of
enlisted entioncd two or raorc scientific developments. I uclear pro-
pulsion was mentioned most frequently by officers (26.2,0 while guided
sdssiles were mentioned most often (2*>.5$) by the enlisted group.
Items mentioned In second nlace were just the inverse of these.
aestion No. 2 was designed to test knowledge of current infor-
mation on the Navy*s atomic powered submarine capability, the fastest
changing area of ship propulsion. The fi£ures published for use by
the 1957 Armed Forces Day spokesmen (May 16, 1957) listed the ,Uus
and a "total of fourteen -ore nuclear powered submarines. n
%eak«ra' uuide for service Spokesman,
nshingtont U. 3. Government Printing
Armed forces i^ay, 19i>7»
iesu< < aa ~ST u mm ng iffice, 1991), p. 10.
.<:
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ic propelled submarine, the ;5kate, was launched at
roton, Conn., on tfay Id, 19 >7, just thret weeks before respondents
were given juration, lairee* This ceremony ess widely publicised by
5
military and civilian news media. In view of these developments it
was expected that ;.ost of the respondents would cheek in either the
»y or »jg» category. Instead, aost of the officers (36.7, .' thought
the Nsvy had six atomic submarines while the enlisted s^ uisj (28.2$)
indicated they thought there were only three, of significance was the
fact that neither group was close to the actual number of 1$ submarines
(only 8.2* of officers and iu3% of enlisted selected this category).
the "don't kiows" and "no answers" were relatively high at 12.2 per
cent for officers and ly.7 per cent for enlisted.
stion Mo. 3 is another question in the current affairs category
of knowledge level measurement. Secretary of the Navy Thomas has
frequently mentioned the figure hpo as the number of submarines tiussia
has. The press has reported this figure many times in the past year.
Admiral Jerauld "right, rsjwisjn/tnr in Chief Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic
ileet, nhen discussing antisubmarine capabilities before the Overseam
Press Club, said: "these (fleet) units are few... to account for the
6
ijQO Soviet submarines of today rand t,heir 85 ?gt year increase.
*




rl"*g» April 20, 1957. Navy Times, the :uost widely read
newspaper devoted to I avy news, carried a United iress story with
dateline of January 18, 19$7, on submarines in which it reported, "The
H*vy now has 1$ atonic submarines either authorised, under construction,
or complied. " The same article indicated +,hat four more are in budget
requests for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 195?.
6
Jerauld I right, Admiral, USN, "NATO j'resentstion xiefore the
seas Press Club of America," arch 28, 1956, havy Public tatements
( ashingtori! rtisent of the Navy, 1956), p. 2*4.
-%.: K
g m«i
uof responses given by enlisted nsn* Answers varied fro. "6 or 7" to
"U,000 t i e table clearly shows that none of the code
groups naaed by enlisted respondents were n« ar the IrOO category. In
tact, these re npondents spread their answers fairly evenly in other
categories with most of ,hem ($*•&() la the "don't know1' and 'no
answer" groups* The officers indicated a fair knowledge of this
item but only ij0»9 per cent clustered their answers into the l£0 and 250
categories* The next highest officer groups were in the ?0Q and 300
range with lu*3 per cent in the "don't know" and "no answer" categories.
stion No* U produced int« resting enlisted responses in view of
the fact that no publicity one «ay-or-<t; e-other in regard to Kussian
atonic submarines has been reported in the press or mad*) in speeches
recently to the knowlcd*/. of this writer. The presumption then is
that < uaaia does not have any ataxic submarines* The significant fact
hers is that the largest category of the enlisted group (3&»5
believed that Kussla doss have nuclear powered subaarinea* The "don't
knows" and "no answers" hers, again* add up to wore than one-fourth
of the enlisted sample*
stion lev 5 was designed to test the sample in the current
affairs area of amphibious warfare capability. The officer group
indicated a high level awareness of this fact* The Navy's last amphib-
ious landing under cacbat conditions wag mads in Korea* Of great signifi-
cance is the large percentage of enlisted "don't kows" and "no answers,
-uestion No* 6 was included to see how Havynen wars keeping up-to-
date on the long-distance flying range (capability) of new planes opersting
frost carriers* During I orld War II* the range of carrier planes was in tits
i
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Jarea of 700 to 300 miles. Today's planes have an ur Led range of
7
3,CkX> r.iilea. This questi I especially significant bt-caues
just four days before the survey was placed in the field two kywarrior,
medium jet bombers, flew non-stop from the carrier chard in
the Pacific and landed on the D3S Saratoga in the Atlantic. The press
reported this event as "the first ocean-to-ocean carrier flight in
8
history." It -was part of a demonstration of the Wavy's capability
in air striking power put on before Resident ' isenhower and
of his cabinet. These events uey have helped the officer group to
answer this question but, even so, the . .ur cent appears low for
this group in light of the above circumstances. The enlisted group
*** extremely low percentage-wise with 6. (i per ce.t in the "2,ouU to
3,000" mile category, hack of awareness of the range of liavy plants
after the ocean-to-ocean demonstration is considered to be one of the
most significant findings in the su vey. Mass media news of these
events either did not reach these people, or they didn*t associate
the question with thess events, or they were not interested enough to
read about this kind of news, I he high percentage of "don 1 t knows* and
"no answers" in both groups has considerable significance.
In the opinion area regarding capabilities six questions were used
7
Charles S. Thomas, former Secretary of he havy, in a speech
ore the Symington ^abcomittee, United states Senate, June 26, 1956,
ublic 'tater.>ents> August, 1956 ( ashington: I tpartuent of the
avy, 1956), ... .
I









1# Do you thiak the aircraft carrier is uecomint -ore important
in the event of a future war or less important
2, Which weapon of any of the three military services do you
think would be the most important single weapon in a future war^
3, List as many things you think the ;iavy could do to stop the
enemy and bring victory. Include as : any major warfare activities
or jobs as possible,
U. Uo you know what a hunter-killer group is?
5. fthat do you think is the primary job of a hunter-killer group?
6* The i^avy*8 new atomic weapons have caused sane change in its
capabilities since World ^ar II. How much change do you think has
taken place









OPINION RSSPCKSES TO 'IONS GK NAVY'S CAPABILITY
Total
Questions and Officers Listed Sample
Code Categories | I
1. Importance of carriers in a
future war:
More important 81.6 87.2 85.6
Less important Iul 5.1 lu8
Same 12.3 M 6.0
Don't know 2.0 2.6 u
No answer mm 1.7 1.2
iota! 100.0 10U.0 luo.o
2. :iost important single weapon





Rifle (or foot soldier)
Missile submarine
Atomic weapons
Not one—-all are important








Intercontinental ballistic missile (U.S. Air Force)
•Strategic Air Command, U. S. Air force
3. Things to do to stop the enemy and
bring victory:
Control the seas


































































nstions and Officers nlisted Sample
Code Categories % % ;
Kadar -warning luJ 2.7 3.5
Control submarines 3.8 2.3 3.0
-scort convoys 3,8 1.8 2.8
Tensive attack 3.3 7.2 5.3
/rovide caabat support 3-3 1.1; 2.3
Defend the United States 3.3 1.8 2.6
idiness for combat 2.9 3.6 3.U
Other 8.1 1U.5 ll.U
Don^t know .5 9.1 U.9
fcio answer 2.9 15. .> 9.5
Total 100*0 100.0 lOw.w
b.
5.
Note: 87, if officers gave answers in 2 or more categories.
U1.9/' of enlisted M • • • «





















submarines 91.8 UU.U 58.U
Seek out and destroy enemy U.1 18.8 1U.5
Don't know 2.0 2U.8 18.7
No answer 2.1 12.0 ....
Total 100.0 10U.0 loo.o
6. -a :ing the degree of change in
capabilities due to atomic
weapons:
Little change 2.0 0.8 1.2
Moderate change 8.2 15.2 13.3
Oreat change 55.1 52.1 53.0
^ery great change 3U.7 29.1 30.7
Don*t know w
.9 .6
No answer — 1.7 1.2















Results of question R#« 1 supoort and affirm other statements
9
made by Navy officials that carriers are continuing to be of najor
importance in any possible future war. n announcement haa been made
M ID
that the first atomic powered carrier will be la operation by 1961.
.ioth groups . :-re practically equal in their high rating of the aircraft
carrier's importance. The enlisted men gave it a slightly higher
ruark (87«2/i>) as compared to the officers (13*40) « This was a closed-
end question with four check-categories given.
aestion No. 2 was designed to see whether Wavymen would choose
a weapon especially designed for naval warfare as the most important,
or one frori the other services. It was felt that a great deal could
be learned about their general knowledge and thinking about military
capabilities from responses made to this open-end question. Answering
this question is admittedly difficult when there is such an array of
destructive weapons now available to 0*1 • military forces. It is
significant to note that both groups rated "missiles" more than twice
as often a3 other weapons. In this category the intercontinental
11
ballistic missile was mentioned specifically a number of times.
9
Arleigh A. iiurke, Admiral, UiStf, Chief of Naval Operations in answer
to an interview question about the change in attitude toward carriers in
recent years said: "I think that people have started to recognize the
importance of the carrier and v«hat she can do as an important part of
the total linited States air power." "ii-iSomb Cannot Mpe Out the U. 1*
Navy," U. 9, :;cws id orld Heport , ay U, 1956, ?• 86.
10
Anay«&avy-Air Force Register, June cj, 1957 (p« 5), carried an
article in which it said: "The Wavy has requested funds for construc-
tion of an atomic powered carrier in the 1958 program and five more
after that. Late in the 1961 calendar year, the Navy 1 ill have its
first atomic-powered carrier in operation."
-^-Tfte intercontinental ballistic missile (5*000-? die) is assigned
to the Air x orce. The longest range missile assigned to the ftavy is a
1^00-mile ballistic missile, "Decision on Missiles," Time Magazine,
December 10, 1956, p. 25.
r> -













Also of note was that officers ranked the rifle (or foot sol icr. at
the third iost important weapon (after issiles and the H-borab but
before the missile submarine), fcnlisted men ranked the rifle as
fourth :ioat Important, The "don't knows" and "no answers" were rela-
tively low percentagewise*
The third question in this series was designed as ohe most crucial
measurement. It attempted to measure the understanding rcen had of the
Navy's capabilities. As in the general question on "mission" it pre-
sented pMNUfcs in coding due to the large number of categories. Here
in the analysis stage it is difficult to assess the degree of unorr-
standing Mi have of this area. The question was deliberately reworded
at the last Minute before the pretest to eliminate the word "capabilities"
which, in the opinion of several naval officers, was too abstract to be
readily understood fey the majority of respondents. The heavy overlap
of five categories between this question and the one on "mission" (see
Table VII) indicates respondents had either a hazy cental distinction
between the too abstract terms or the question was poorly worded (lew
validity). Categories mentioned by respondents in both questions are
in the yicrcentages indicated in this tabulation:
capabilities -ission
Code ittms Officers .^listed Officiera -nlisted
2 |
Control of the




11.9 9.0 5.5 2.6
Logistic support lul lei 5.9 h.$
Defend the u. S. 3.3 1.8 8.0 13.1
Readiness for
combat 2.9 3.6 5.1 5.2
I












The first of these five items, co trol of the seas, of course is
the primary over-all mission of the Navy, If respondents, in -ention-
ing, control of the seas, under "things to do to stop the eney" in the
capabilities section were actually referring to the ability, or caoa-
bility, then they -woulri be displaying a high level understanding of the
term "capabilities," This is not dear, however, free the responses
/en. "capability" as r; entioned in the earlier part of this study is
taken to mean ability to take action in a specific area of warfare and
usually for sustained periods of ti^e. Respondents very seldom indi-
cated this clearly in responses but merely mentioned weapons, olanes,
ships, etc., without saying what should be done with them, or i -.ere
they should be used in warfare. The question: "List as many thing*
you think the llavy could do to stop the enemy and bring victory.
Include as many major warfare activities or jobs as possible," was
considered sufficiently clear in this regard. The only conclusion,
then, aopears to be a lack of clear understanding between the two
terms. Similar discussions could be advanced for the other four
cross-mentioned categories.
In the interest-attitude, or motivational, area of l<^rning about
the Navy's capabilities, six questions were asked*
1. -ach new weapon is designed to fit into the over-all capability
of the Navy. Do you feel fairly certain that you know how each would
be used in battle?
2. How well do ycr<i feel that you are kept informed about the
capabilities of the Navy resulting from new weapons?
3. ^hat percentage of the world* s lsnd would you guess can now
be reached by carrier-based planes?
.:.."."
-




km Bo you happen to know whether or not the «iavy can launch
guided missiles frov. submarines?
$• ff*t of .he Davy's experimental jet seaplanes crashed
Mttkly* Bo you know if the Navy is cou-oinuing to uevelop this plane
or not"
6, In your opinion, is the Navy giving its people enough train-
ing on the mission ana capabilities?






AN 3N DIC AT I I TICS FOR L ARNING
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Questions and Officer Salisted Sample
Code Categories fi g
1, Certainty oi' knowing how new
weapons would be used in
battl
Don't know 10.2 14.5 13.3
, sure 3h.7 43.6 u0.9
1 airly sure lik.9 38.5 DO.U
Very sure 8.2 .4 3.0
No answer 2.0 2.6 2.U
Total 1U..C loO.O io^.O
2. How well respondent feels he





Don't know — — —
No answer 2. 2.6 2.U




3. Percentage of worlds land
area that can be reached by
carrier-based planes:
Up to 2:; 2.0 2.6 2.4
25 to 5o* 8.2 11.1 10.2
5o to 75$ 28.6 29.9 29.5
75 to 101 57.1 U7.0 5o.l
Don't know — 3.4 2.U
No answer M 6.0 5.4
Total 100.0 100.0 lOo.O
navy submarine missile
capability:
Can be launched 89.8 31.2 83.7
nnot be launched — 1.7 1.2
Don't know J. 2 16.2 13.9
No answer 2.0 .9 1.2








Questions and Officers nlisted Sample
Code Categories % f i
5. Seaplane development program
( Seaaaster)
*
ontinuing to develop 69.U UU.U 51.8
oecided to drop mm 2.7 1.8
xi 1 1 know 30.6 52.9 U6.U
No answer — — —
Total 100f 100.0 100.0
6. Navy giving its people enough
training on the mission and
capabilities?
t
Xes 28.6 23.1 2U.7
No 53.1 35.0 i*>.3
Undecided 12.2 140.2 32.0
Don , t know — — —
No answer 6.1 1.7 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0 lou.o
uestion No. 1 was provided with four alternative check-categories
to nake it easy for respondents to answer and to facilitate the later
coding and tabulating process. By additional grouping now of the first
two and last two, it is noted that hh*$ per cent of officers and 58.1
per cent of enlisted acknowledge that they did not have too >ood an
understanding of the way the Navy would use its new weapons. These
percentages are considered to be low in relation to the large percent-
age in each category that said they had a good understanding of the
Navy 1 s mission (89.8> of officers and 75.2a of enlisted). In the
officer group 75.5 per cent had also served overseas since fcorld «*ar II.
"uestion No. 2, anothe r closed-end question, was designed as a
..
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cross-check on the reliability of responses given in question No. 1,
The two questions were spaced five questions apart in the questionnaire.
The second was a self-rating question on opinions regarding their own
knowledge level of the Navy's capabilities, by comparing responses of
these two questions, it is rioted that only 2U«5 per cent of officers
said they were "little informed" compared to hhm$f> of "don't knows"
and "not sures" in No. 1* forty-one per cent of the enlisted 7.en said
they were "little informed" as compared to 53.1 per cent in the uncer-
tainty areas of weapon usage.
uestion No. 3 provided another check on interest-attitudes by
asking respondents to consider the worla-wide operating, or mobility
area, of the Navy in terms of the percentage of the land mass that
could be reached by carrier aircraft. Higher percentages of responses
were expected in the "75 to 1Q0V category than those received (57.1%
for officers and itf.Cfa for enlisted). This was due to the fact that
three-fourths of the world is water in which the Navy operates, plus
the 3,000-mile range of carrier-based planes. I study of geographical
land masses leaves only a relatively small area of Russia out of range
of carrier-based planes.
Question No. U indicates that a higher percentage of both groups
12
know this part of the Navy's capability in submarine warfare.
Question No. 5 produced a high percentage of responses in the
12
m of this high percentage may have resulted from an article
appearing in the Armyftavy-Air x orce Ker.lster, June b, 1957, in regard
to the 2l£5-ton guided missile subraarine I iiarbero joining the Inter-
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officer group fdM knew (I « than half (Uuii>) of enlisted
knew the answer to this question. 'ress statements made by Navy offi-
cials shortly after the second ,Jet seaplane crashed indicated that the
Jiavy would continue to develop this plane, e rous other articles
hove appeared in military newspapers regarding tests and development
is for this plane since that time. The large ($t«9£) number of
"don't knows" in the enlisted group may be due to the high percentage
of this group (<;6.5£) who were in the "under-one-year" category of
experience in the Navy.
uestion it* 6 is significant in that it indicates that about
three-fourths of both groups feel that the Navy is not giving its people
enough training in the areas of mission and capabilities, or are neutral
in the "undecided" category. Only one—fourth were positive enough to
mark the "yes" category.
In su.;imary, Table XII indicates that interests of both groups was
the highest and most consistent in regard to the potential capabilities
of the missile submarine ;nd at the lowest knowledge level in use of
new weapons. From comparison of question Ho» 6 in this table with No. U
in Table VIII (opinion on whether Havy is telling people enough about
the mission) an indication is noted that the enlisted group would like
more information on both mission and capabilities. Officers are more
interested in learning about capabilities as indicated by the signifi-
cant change of $1,0 per cent "yes" on sufficiency of mission information















Sources of information. Of : ,ajor interest in analysis of knowledge,
or information levels, for use in improving education is to investigate
sources of the individual* s information* Also of interest is to receive
opinions and ideas from the group on what kind of information and how
it feels that ost training should be given in these areas. With these
objectives in mind a mmber of questions were constructed in three
broad areas: fact (sources of information), opinion (on effectiveness;,
and interest-attitude (suggestions for future training,.
In the fact area three questions were constructed to find out
where respondents got most of their information and to learn something
of their reading habits.
1. Where do you get most of your information about the Navy?
2. Special lectures on the increasing importance of .he iiavy
are being given at many commands. The lecture is illustrated with a
series of color slides showing new developments and capabilities of
the Ilavy. Have you seen this presentation
3. How often do you read articles on the following
Navy^ role in peacetime' New weapon a?
Navy's role in wartime? ational strategy of the U.S.?
Sea power? Articles on NATO, PLATO, and
similar military pacts?
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Code Categories % % %



















No answer U.7 6^2 6,1
















Motex 83.7£ of officers fWPl answers in 2 or more categories.
61.5% of enlisted " " " ii
2. Have seen special
presentation:
sea power






3. Frequency of reading articles
on mission and capabilities t







































Never 6.1 12.0 10*2
Sometimes 55.1 U5.3 U8.3
Often 30.6 33.3 32.5
No answer 1.1 9.h 9.0
Hew weapons—
Never — 15.U 10,8
'Fu"ti..e8 U2.9 U7.9 1*6.U
Often 5l.o 28.2 3U.9
No answer 6.1 8.5 7.9
National strategy of U.S.—
Never 6*1 29.9 22.8
oraetimes 57.2 U2.7 U7.0
Often 30.6 12.0 17.5
No answer 6.1 15.U 12.7
NATO, SEATO, and similar pacts—
Never 6.1 1*0.2 30.1
Sometimes 71.ii 35.1 U5.8
ften Uu3 6.8 9.0
No answer (3.2 17.9 1 .1
The table shows that officers raentioned Navy Times, the civilian
weekly newspaper, .uost often as one of their sources of information
while enlisted mentioned the official Navy publication, All Hands
magazine (a monthly published by the x)ureau of Naval Personnel).
Second and third in importance to officers weret official publications
and All Hands. For enlisted the second and third places were: . v/
Times and Our Navy magazine (civilian). Officers listed Time magazine
as fourth while enlisted mentioned "people."
The second question is of value to see how far the special internal
t«
Hi
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information campaign on sea power has progressed since it was inaugurated
more than a year ago. Tesms of officers h ve been giving this illustrated
presentation at a number of installations, and the .bureau of Naval
Personnel has set it up in all schools under their control. If the per-
centage fi.aires here app^y to tim entire Havy, more than 83,000 officers
and men have seen this presentation to date. The sea power presentation
is the major effort now underway to educate people on the mission and
capabilities of the Navy,
uestion No. 3 indicates reading hauits in areas involving naval
affairs* Most check-responses were in the "sometimes" read category.
The ofxicer group listed articles on NATO and ktO most frequently
while the enlisted group indicated "Navy's peacetime role" interested
them the -iost. Second and third in each group were: for officers,
the "Davy's peacetime role" and "national strategy;" and for enlisted
men, "new weapons" and "Navy's wartime role,"
In the area of opinion measurement on effectiveness of various
educational methods and channels of information, a series of nine
questions were constructed,
1, Do you think ship and station newspapers are effective or
ineffective in keeping personnel informed about the Navy?
2, Do you send your ship's newspaper home to your family or
friends?
3» Saw service person el feel that there is a great amount of
information available from official Havy publications. Do you agree
with this'







5. In your opinion, how do you think wires of naval personnel
feel about the amount of information they are getting about the Navy
6. If married, do you think it would help you in your work if
your wife knew more about the Navy?
7. Hie television programs called "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log"
have been produced from Navy background material* iiave you seen either
of these programs?
8. How effective do you think these programs are ir. telling the
public about the Navy?
9. How do you feel about the amount of information the Navy gives
you about wha^s going on within the service?
Question responses for this series are presented in Table XIV,
TABLI~ XIV
OPINION RESPOiS&S GN 'FFMCTIVFHESS OF INFORMATION MtUIA
AND EDDCATICN METHODS
gittl
uestions and Officers flnlisted Sample
Code Categories % g %
1. Effectiveness of ship and
station newspapers
t
.active 22.U 1*8.7 la.o
Ineffective U9.0 26.5 33.1
Undecided &•* 21. k 22.3
No answer U.l 3.1i 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
2. Send ship 1 s newspaper hornet
Never 63.1 62.3 62.7
Sometimes 28.8 2U.0 25.3
Often 2.0 6.0 U.8
No answer 6.1 7.7 7.2
Total ioo.o 100.0 100.0
.,.















!3tions and Officers listed Sample
Code Categories % r %
3. Agreement on statement about
"great amount" of information
being available in Navy pub-
lications!
Yes 85.7 73.5 77.1
..o 10.2 19.7 16.9
DonH know — .8 .6
No answer
-4 6.0 *4
Total 100.0 10 ... 100.0
h» Availability of Wavy publi-
cations when men want to
read than:
Yes 81.7 U8.7 58.5
Mo 10,2 tea 31.3
Undecided 1.0 2.6 2.U
No answer 6.1 8.6 7.8
Total 100.0 10O.C 100.0
5. How wives feel about amount of
information they are receiving
about the Navy:
Would like more 57.2 51.3 53.1
Have enough 30.6 20.5 23.5
Get too much now 2.0 Hi.5 10.8
t.'on»t know — 7.7 5.U
No answer 10.2 6.0 7.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.
6, should help husbands if wives
knew more about the Navyt
Yes 38.9 21.U 26.5
No 22.U 12.8 15.7
Some 10.2 7.7 let
Much — — ~
DonH know 2.0 U.3 3.6
Not married 20. h tf.3 38.0
No answer 6.1 8.5 f.
















7. Knowledge off "Victory at "ea"
d "Navy Log" television
programs:
Have seen one 6.1 12.0 MU1
Have seen both 89.8 83. 85.6
Have not seen either — 14.3 3.0
No answer U.l — 1.2
Total loo.o 1UU.0 10. .0
8. 1 ffectiveness of TV programs
in telling public about Navyi
Not effective — li.2 2.9
Fairly effective 57.8 1*7.5 50.6
vary effective 36.5 U5.8 U3.
"Navy Log" not very
effective 1.9 1.7 1.7
Dor^t know — . .6
No answer 3.8 mm 1.2
Total lOu.O iou.o lOo.O
9. Feeling about amount of
information Navy gives
personnel about what is
| ping ont
Receive too much 8.2 2.6 k.2
Hi enough 38.8 61.5 5U.9
Right amount h6.9 31.6 36.1
Don't know —
.9 .6
No answer 6.1 3.U U.2
Total ibb»c 100,0 IQO.0
uestion Ijo. 1 is an excellent illustration of differences in
evaluating the importance of ship and station newspapers, rioth groups
wr re about equally divided, 50 per cent of each taking opposite views
in their evaluations. .Most officers rated these newspapers ineffective






It is significant that only U8,7 per cent of the enlisted rroup *'elt
that these newspapers were effective,
:cstion no9 2 shows significant results clue to slightly laore
(li#8i~; ) officers who "sometimes" send their ship's newspaper heme
even though they were the most outspoken about the ineffectiveness of
these papers,
Quest: • 3 shows both groups agreed that a "great amount" of
information is available from Navy official publications,
lestion No. k indicates that enlisted men do not have as great
an opportunity to see official publications as do officers. This lack
of availability was mentioned in comments both groups made to the final
question on suggestions for improvement in training methods.
About half of both groups in question No, 5 felt that their wivaa
would like to receive more information about the Navy. Responses by
officers to question No, 6 is significant in that almost hp per cent
said it would be helpful to them in their careers if their wives knew
more about the Navy, This is over half of the 75,5 per cent married
officers in the sample.
Questions No, 7 and 8 indicate that high percentages (in 80-90*
bracket) of both groups had seen both "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log"
television programs, jrfut, in the second question, which was not worded
well (because respondents had to give one answer for effectiveness of
both programs), most officers rated these shows as only "fairly
effective," Some respondents, however, wrote in another category
for "Navy Log" and marked it "not effective" and gave f,Victor aan
a "very effective" rating.
. >i3i» s
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la question No. i percentage of officers (k6»9%) felt
that the Mavy is telling them about the right amount of what is going
on. i'his is not a high percentage in view of what it coula be. ihe
enlisted group gave almost twice as /iany "not enough" marks as the
next highest category. This would tend to indicate they gelt strongly
about the lack of information.
In the interest-attitude area of the questionnaire two questions
were used.
1. Where do you think that aost of the instruction on the iiavy 1 s
mission and capabilities should be given?
2. »hat are your suggestions on new ways of keeping personnel
informed about the mission and capabilities of the Navy?












estions and Officers listed 3ar.»ple
Code Categories f—
1. **here to give raost of the
instruction on mission and
capabilities:
In schools 10.2 12,0 11.U
On-the-job 22.k 19.7 20.5
ix>th 55,2 63.2 60.9
Other 2.0 «MB .6
Don't know 6.1 5.1 5.U
No answer h.l — 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.
2. Suggestions on new ways to keep





Motivate people to learn
i'ilns before theater movies
More training on job
Kegular briefings for crew
Wider distribution of present
material
lixplain ship's movements to
crew



























Kotej 1*0.3% of officers gave answers in 2 or more categories.
BUT* of enlisted " M " " " w "
Somewhat over half of each group indicated in question No. 1 that
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In suggestions aade for new ways of training, ooth groups were in
agreement on "more lectures" and "show more films," trm there the
two groups differed considerably, rhe officer group made more
specific reco i'uendations as to lectures, efforts to motivate peo .It to
learn, and suggested showing more Navy film documentaries before
theater movies. The third highest percentage recommendation by the
enlisted group was to make wider distribution of material presently







PRESET TRAINING MfcTHOBS AND SPtClAL PROGRAM*
i. analysis of mmmt training programs
>ome form of education, or indoctrination, In the Navy's mission
and capabilities is being taught to students in all Navy schools. The
amount of time and method of presentation varies from school to school
depending on the type of primary training being conducted. Recruits
new to the Navy receive general orientation training on organisation,
functioning, special sea power presentation (mentioned earlier), and
naval history. The highest level of study in these fields is reached
in courses on strategy and tactics for senior officers at the Naval
Mm College, Newport, R. I«
A summary of curricula offered in a few Navy trainin schools is
1
presented in Table JCVI,
ita assembled from Catalog of U# S, Naval Trai-;.., r^tivi fries
and Courses, NAVP1&P 91769-13 t«ashington7 E S, Government Printing







i TRAINING CCUI: . « AND CAPABILIj" ..
School . tudents rsc8 Offered




Armed Forces Staff Gollege military officers













Naval Postgraduate School Regular ttavy officers
General Line School who were formerly
Monterey, Calif. reserve and temporary
Naval Intelligence School Officers selected
Washington, D. C. for intelligence duty
toaval School, Journalists LTJG through LODR who
Info, Officers Course show interest and
Great Lakes, 111. ability in PR
NROTC Courses at 52
colleges and univer-
sities in U.S.
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II. 0GRA1B
Sea power briefing program* A special sea power briefing
presentation has been prepared (1956) for wide aissQcuLiation throughout
the Navy. It is entitled "The Increasing importance of '.he U« 1« Navyw
and outlines the tactics to be employed in utilization of the iavy»s
newest weapons in event of any future war. This presentation is an
excellent method of bringing pco.>l up-to-date on the mission and
capabilities of the Navy. It is now a "continuing part of the
2
curricula of the bureau of Naval Personnel schools." The same .Material
is being "incorporated into all Navy training publications and correspond-
3
encc course programs," and into examination areas for advancement in
rate of enlisted men.
-nlistca career symposia. The Wavy is aware of the need of its
enlisted personnel to be recognized as individuals to the extent that
this is possible in a military organization. In 1956 It conducted
Beatings of its senior enlisted men at the training centers in
..ainbridge, Md., and San Diego, Calif. Representatives were sent to
these meetings from duty stations throughout the United states and
overseas ships and stations*
A total of 197 recommendations were made to the Department of the
2
Letter report by Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel ( ducction








iiavy in areas of special i to enlisted career roen. Thos«
k
vant to this study we;
1. That emphasia on the Javy's role be continued directly to
the individual.
2. That operating schedules of ships be established as far in
advance as possible} promul he 1 . formation, and x that any
changes made are done justifiably and not arbitrarily.
3* That ship deployment schedules be published far enough in
advance for pergonal planning by Mfe
iu That weekly briefings be held for enlisted personnel 7/ith
up-to-date Information on current operations and deployment schedules.
£. That briefing sessions between canranding officers and chief
petty officers take place at least once a week.
6. That more emphasis be placed on relationship of local ission
to over-all role.
7. That Navy training flias be directed toward a Davy audience,
edited and kept up-to-date, showing latest developments of the Uavy's
role and r mission.
it
f-d ..oc eport on Uilistcd Career ^yuposia ceo -ons, a
:>rt orfeared by the Office f the Chief of Naval Operations,
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I. SUMUARI
This investigation has produced empirical data in the area of
knowledge and understanding that personnel have of tha Navy's mission
and capabilities. Foundation for the study of this knowledge area
was an analysis of current concepts of sea power and the national
strategy of the United States. Out of this analysis was developed the
concept of the Davy's mission, roles, and functions substantiated by
documents setting forth fundamental policy directives.
Using this background material as a frame of reference for the
study, a descriptive survey of naval personnel was conducted. Social
science research techniques were aiployed to gain as high a degree of
validity and reliability as possible in the study. The survey attempted
to measure knowledge level and interest-attitudes of people now on active
duty in the Navy, ilany questions in the area of ''mission 1 ' and "capabili-
ties" were asked of respondents in a 166-cian survey sample. Conclusions
from the analysis of responses to these questions were discussed in
detail in Chapter IV,
Present trainin methods and programs relating to this general ar«a
were outlined in Chapter V.
II. CCKCUISICNS
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investigated in this study—that of training or indoctrinating people
on the toission and capabilities of t,he Havy as an instrument of national
defense, ureat strides have been taken in the past year toward solving
this problem, iiany teams of lecturers have been conducting the special
sea power briefings, other teams have been working on ways of improving
the internal information prograi, eoKuaanding officers have been furnished
a list of symposia reco., endations made by senior petty officers with
instructions to take action on a number at the command level* ives of
Navymen have been shown the special sea power presentation, taken on day
cruises aboard ships and invited to visit shore co .and* where their
husbands work*
Interviews conducted in Viashington with training officials indicate
that the acadeoic approach to a study of subjects in these areas are as
complete as possible. Curricula of schools have been recently reviewed
and revised in this regard. In :iany schools where time does not permit
a full scale course of instruction, individual instruction periods are
used for lectures and film screenings whenever possible.
In view of the complete academic program now being iollowed in
formal training schools, the reoaamandations in this paper will be in
the nature of a very broad plan of education and internal information
to reach deeper into the motivational and attitudinal areas of learning*








discussion. Internal information of the kind ^hat relates the main
objective or function of the individual com-and to that of the over-all
Navy seems to be the most important area for emphasis in a plan of edu-
cation. A ;uan*s education at this level in the organization can I
interpreted by him in L.ore .ueaningful ways. In this manner a nan can
learn what the task of his unit is in the larger organization, .-hen he
relates his unit to a larger objective it will be easier for hia to make
the next downward adjustment to that on a personal level* Ke will be
able to relate individual duties more readily to that of efficient
functioning of the command. Briefings, lectures, indoctrination tours
of the command, and demonstrations are a few techniques available to
help orient individuals to their own com and. ilany of these devices
wsre suggestod in responses to survey questionnaires. Interest in the
briefing procedure and need for more information were incorporated as
recommendations by the enlisted career symposia.
Recommendation, tfiat a system of command level briefings be
established on a regular basis (weekly, monthly, or quarterly) with
attendance required of all personnel as an information and education
training program. This program should be developed in earnest fashion
with sufficient high-level backing to the point where it becomes "built-
in" to the Naval IEstablishment as a permanent responsibility of command.
It should cover the relationship of the co^and aud local mission to
the over-all mission of the Navy. Responsibility in this area should be
added to the check list of items to be reviewed at the annual Adminis-
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Discussion A comiaent frequently sack en aboard ships is
the lack of information about operating schedules (survey response*
pointed this out,, ffhore the/ are going on the next patrol or exercise
and why* Personnel indicate that not enough is told thaa about tha
individual cruise schedule nor Jiose planned for the future.
co.- endation* That a campaign bo initiated to encourage
Ml andirr; •f£t4MM of whips to Ml their |MMMMl MmA Ifefl
current unclassified operating schedules are for their vessels so
that iien ;iay better plan their personal affairs and gain a sense of
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iscusaioru Internal infer .atio. MM fr r from
lack of coordination and planni oessary to cau3e news or a-
tion material to flow free the iaany offices and control centers where
it is generated. Hot enough enlisted journalists are available to act
as reporters covering Mill wide news beats within large ccc.iands.
Sana system of scheduling,or planning, is desirable that will cauaa
information to be brought to the attention of those in immediate
charge and released to nedia channels.
ecoci :cndation . To investigate the feasioility of including a
aection in the public information annex to all operational plans
called "informing personnel." This section to include date that
information should be released to crew, a suri^ary of how much detail
(Mould be released, . the nor»ie of the person responsible to see
that it is executed on tima.
1
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1 (ecorimendation No * kt
..iscussioii, general coawient voiced by many respondents in the
survey was that not enough copies arc available of All ;;andg
Aviation Mews (both official "iavy publications), and others. The
enlisted group named All i i.ands most often as the source of ;aost of
their information about the Navy.
:iocaiat..endation» That wider distribution of All i ;-ndg magazine,
Aviation :. cws» and other sind-lar official publications be investigated
as a cans of providing personnel with iaore educational material on




ilscussion. The special sea power presentation has recently
been revised. Shis presentation is a very comprehensive lecture,
illustrated with color slides, on the Navy*s mission and capabilities
and discusses sea warfare tactics in the European area as well. The
writer has seen the presentation twice and studied the printed
material concerning it. Since it has been pretested on roughly
83,000 people as indicated in the survey, it would appear that it
may be ready now for the next logical step in its development—that
of a sound motion picture.
Recranendatlon. That an investigation be made into the
feasibility of producing a sound motion picture on the sea power
presentation called, "The Increasing Importance of the I« 3, Navy,"
for theater screenings as a "short subject,"
.*« 9d3 nl tmSmoHuit ©a >Xqcoq .
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uKecom :endation Mo « 6s
Discussion . One recognized teaching technique, that of
participation, could be effectively utilized to a higher degree in
the teaching of mission and capabilities. Ey allowing a selected
group of enlisted men to accompany ships on special exercises to
foreign countries, and to observe fleet training exercises, atomic
weapon tests, missile firing tests, etc*, would appear to be an
excellent teaching-by-doing device. Learning by participation and
observation in this area is the most meaningful of all forms of
education.
A competitive system for the most attractive cruise; such as,
"honor cruises," would stimulate interest and lend itself to incentive
programs designed to motivate personnel to learn ;.ore in this area.
Those :,ien who are in predominately shore-based billets would have more
of an opportunity to see the operating forces thereby relating their
individual duties to the larger objectives of the Navy.
Recommendation
. That an investigation be made into the
feasibility of establishing special quotas for enlisted participation
in the more attractive overseas cruises; such as, the midshipman
cruises to foreign countries, fleet training cruises; special weapons
dsaonstrations; :nd on a lower level of participation, in the day
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Diiscussion. The need for improvement in dissemination of inforaation
internal ly was commented upon frequently in survey responses. The follow-
ing recommendations are made based upon those findings:
-ocom-endation « That an investigation be made into the possible
production of a series of Navy • . test-yourself quiszes for use in
various Navy newspapers and official publications. They may be similar
to those appearing in Reader's i-'igcst and other popular uatazines but
containing questions on mission, capabilities, etc.
recommendation. That editors of Navy newspapers be encouraged
to address a larger portion of their newspaper space and editorial
content to wives of naval personnel. -Stimulating interest of this
group in Navy activities genorally will serve as an effective tool to
a better understanding of their husbands* duties and the objectives
of the command.
Uocom endation. That an investigation be made into the
feasibility of establishing a Navy news bureau in Washington* D. C.
for ship and station newspapers. ither n new section may be formed
or the present functioning of the Armed Forces Press Service, as it
pertains to Navy news, may be streamlined for more effective and
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SARX II Ai*D DiJ'BI ITIONS*
Air Defense, All measures desired to nullify or reduce the effectiveness
of the attack of hostile aircraft or guided missiles after they are
air^borne.
Air Superiority, That degree of capability (preponderance in morale and
material) of one air force over another which permits the conduct
of air operations by the former at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing air force.
Air Supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air
force is incapable of effective interference.
Amphibious Operation, An attack launched from the sea by naval and
landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a
hostile shore. An amphibious operation includes final preparation
of the objective area for the landing and operations of naval, air,
and ground elenents in over-water movements, assault, and mutual
support. An amphibious operation may precede a large-scale land
operation, in which case it becomes the amphibious phase of a
joint amphibious operation. After the troops are landed and firmly
established ashore the operation becomes a land operation.
Antisubmarine Operations. Operations contributing to the conduct of
antisubmarine warfare.
ntisubmarine ..arfare. Operations conducted against submarines, their
supporting forces, and operating bases,
base, A locality from which operations are projected or supported.
May b« preceded by a descriptive word such as "air" or "submarine,
"
which indicates primary purpose.
Close Air Support. The attack by aircraft of hostile ground or naval
targets which are so close to friendly forces as to require detailed
integration of each air mission with the fixe and movement of those
forces,
Functions. Responsibilities, missions, and tasks.
In coordination with. In consultation with. This expression means that
*
From "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,"
ection VII, October, 1953, a directive issued by the Secretary of
Defense and quoted in an instruction (Of*AVIUM 5U10.1A) issued by the
Chief of iaval Operations, April 21, 195U*
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agencies "coordinated with" shall participate actively; that their
concurrence shall be sought; and that if concurrence is not obtain-
ed, the disputed matter shall be referred to the next higher author-
ity in which all participants have a voice.
Joint, As used in this (function; paper, and generally among the Aimed
Forces, connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc, in
which elements of iore than one service of the Department of
i>efense participate*
Military, A tern used in its broadest sense meaning of or pertaining
to war or the affairs of war, vtfiether Army, ttavy, or Air i ores*
Naval Campaign, An operation or a connected series of operations
conducted essentially by naval forces including all surface, sub-
surface, air, amphibious, and Marines, for the purpose of gaining,
extending, or maintaining control of the sea*
Operation, A military action, or the carrying out of a military
mission, strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative;
the process of carrying on combat on land, on sea, or in the air,
including movement, supply, attack, defense, and ivianeuvers needed
to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign,
Strategic Air Operations, Air operations contributing to the conduct
of strategic air warfare,
strategic Air '.arfare. Air combat and supporting operations designed
to effect, through the systematic application of force to a
selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and
disintegration of the enemy* s war-making capacity to a point where
he no longer ret ins the ability or the will to wage war. Vital
targets may include key uianufacturing systems, sources of raw
material, critical material, stock piles, power systems, transport-
ation systems, communications facilities, concentration of uncom-
mitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas,








LIST OF NAVAL DS
FROM WHICH OFFICE SAMPL DRAWS
;hore Commands:
itoston Naval Shipyard, Charlestown, Uass*
Commander, boston Group, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, South iioston
Annex, b ston Naval Shipyard, boston, Mass*
Comraander, U» S. Naval base, Newport, R. I.
Harbor Defense Quit, Naval Base, Portar*outh, t« H«
Headquarters, First Naval JJistrict, bo ton, 'ias3*
Q, S. Naval Air ''tation, Quonset Point, R. I.
IU S. Uaval Hospital, Newport, R« I.
. 1« Naval Reserve Training Center,
U. S. Naval Station, iiewport, R* I.







Ship Commands:! I i* i m i i w i inn
USS ALBANY (CA-123)—heavy cruiser
RTQi (DD-650)—destroyer
COMMANDER CARRpR DIVISION FCURTKBI-
aircraft carriers
USS MACCN (CA-132)—heavy cruiser
USS SMALLS (DD-S6S) —destroyer
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COPY OF gUESTlCNNAIP m SURVFY
OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED WEN
I. MKHQRANDUM ACCOMPANYING Ql I I <AIRKS TO OFFICERS
8 Juru. 19^7
The enclosed questionnaire has been prepared as part of a research
project in the graduate division of jioston University's School of
Public Relations and Communications,
The study is being conducted as part of a thesis suggested by Hear
Acbiral l« B. Taylor, ML Chief of Information, Navy Department,
and has been approved by the Corarkandant, FIRST Naval District*
The thesis is being prepared by t^e undersigned who is one of the
Navy-sponsored students in the graduate division this year.
It would be appreciated if you would complete the questionnaire at
your earliest convenience. Deadline for receipt js 20 June. It is
requested that you write the answers based upon your present know-
ledge of the topics covered. Reference to books, publications or
other people in answering these questions would defeat the purpose
of the study.
A self-addressed envelope is provided for returning the
questionnaire
.
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questionnaire on the Mission and Capabilities
of the U, S, Navy
Date
This questionnaire is part of a study to determine the understanding
personnel have of the Navy's mission and its capabilities as an instrument
of national defense. It is a group study so your answers will be combined
immediately with those of the other 200 people being asked the same
questions. Your understanding of the Navy's mission and capabilities
?.nd your opinions about the need for more information are desired,
completed questionnaire will be forwarded directly to .^oston
University's School of Public delations and communications, Division of
Research, where the study is being conducted.
Your name is not noeded, but it is extre^ cly important that you give
your true feelings and honest opinions in ansvers to these questions in
order that the survey will be of value to the research project. final
report of the group study will be made available to the Navy Department,
In order to tabulate the results of the study the following
information is needed:
.at is your rate or rank? Age?
a
If an officer, what is your designator? "
How many years have you served on active duty in the i*avy?_
Do you plan to make the Navy a career?
Are you in the reserves or the regular >.iavy?_
Ware you based ashore or aboard ship at your
last permanent duty station7
Have you served overseas since V.orld War II'
What cou'.iand are you attached to now?
What was the last school grade (or year) you completed'
~
If you went to college, what was your major?
What is your marital status?
' ingle .Married Divorced V idower
Do you have dependent children?
In which state or foreign country did you live the longest as a child"
"hat kind of work does (or did) your father do*^
When do you expect to be out of the Navy
Do you have a civilian skill or occupational specialty?
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*The questionnaire is divided into three parts: Mission,
capabilities, and sources of information • There are no right or
wrong answers in the usual sense. The purpose of the study is to
find out what you can tell us about these subjects. There is no
time limit in answering the questions.
Mission
1. As far as you know, did the Navy take any action in the Israeli-
Egyptian crisis? . If so, what did it do?
2. Do you feel that the Navy is receiving sufficient public
recognition for the job it is doing in the Mediterranean?
Yes N o Undecided
3. Do you feel you have a good understanding of the mission of
the three military services7
Have very little Have some Have a very good
understanding understanding understanding
km Do you feel you have a good understanding of the Navy f s mission or not?
Yes h o Undecided




6. Newspapers frequently mention the following organizations, fthat
do the letters stand for?
NATO
sfatT
7. The Sixth Fleet has been kept in the Mediterranean for a number of
years. What do you think is the purpose of keeping it there?
8. * hich of the following had the most influence on your first
enlistment in the Navy?
To avoid being drafted
_
Because of career opportunities in the Navy
________
Because of travel opportunities the Navy offers
_»_____,
Because the Navy is the most important branch of
the service
___
Relatives wanted me to join the Navy
_______
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9. The Seventh Fleet has been kept in the Formosa area for a nuraber
of years. . hich of the following do you think has been its ;aost
important job?
To halt a communist attack on Formosa
.
To slow down the spread of comauniam in southeast Asia^
To prevent the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa from
attacking the mainland
Because the Seventh Fleet has to be kept somewhere
and this is as good a place as any
10, V»hat changes, if any, have ^he nation's leaders shown recently
in their attitudes about the importance of the iiavy in a future
conflict
Decreased Decreased No Increased Increased
very much some change some very much
U. Think of the part the Havy played in the country's defense in
World TS«r II. How about today? How do you think the part it now
plays compares with that of i> orld fcar II?
Greater About the Less important
importance same today than in
now importance ..orld &ar II
12. What do you think the avy's job is in the air defense of the
nited States?
13. In your opinion, what is the Navy's mission ( discuss in detail
as to roles, functions, responsibilities, jobs, etc. Please do not
say just "control of the seas.")
.."'
vn .1 .
|| I ft . <-
"' bSMi '•' -•Vn :.), »
H>
VM Ml.




1. Since World Vifar II a number of scientific developments have increased
the Navy's power to wage war. Y»nat are some of these'
2. In what country were t,he last amphibious landings made by the Navy
under actual combat conditions'
3. Do you happen to know whether or not the Navy can launch guided
missiles fro. submarines?
Can be Can NOT be Don't
launched launched know
4. Two of the Navy's experimental jet seaplanes crashed recently. Do
you know if the Navy is continuing to develop this plane or not?
Continuing Decided Don't
to develop to drop know
5« Do you happen to know how ^any nuclear powered submarines the ftavy has
in service and under construction altogether (Include those Congress has
appropriated funds for.)
3 9 15 21
6 12 18 ~_ 21*
6. How many submarines do you think Russia has?
7. Does Russia have any nuclear powered submarines Xes No
8. How well do you feel that you are kept informed about the capabilities
of the Navy resulting from new weapons?
Little Medium well 16all
informed informed informed
9. Do you know what a hunter-killer group is" Yes No
10. what do you think is the primary job of a hunter-killer group?
11. i hat is the longest distance the Navy's newest carrier-based planes
can fly? (Total of the mileage out and back.)
12. v. hat percentage of the world's land area would you guess can now be
reached by carrier-based planes?
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13, I ach new weapon is ad to fit into the over-all capability of
the Navy, L»o you feel fairly certain that you know how each would be
used in battl
Don*t know Not sure i airly sure very sure
Ik* The navy's new atonic weapons have caused some change in its
capabilities since world %sr II, How much change do you think has
taken place:
Little Moderate Great Very great
change change change change
15» £o you vhink that the aircraft carrier is becoming more important
in the event of a future war or less important:
f/iore Lest me Don't know
16, fchich weapon of any of the three military services do you think
-»*ou1q be the most important single weapon in a future war?
17, List as many things you think the Navy could do to stop the












1. I • r< do you get most of your information about the Navy 1st
names of newspapers, magazines, people, eti.
,
2« Do you think that ship and station newspapers are effective or
ineffective in keeping personnel informed about the Navy**
ffective Ineffective idecided
3» Do you send your snipes newspaper hose to your family or friends:
Never ^emetines Often
riow often do you read articles on the follawin, (Check the
column that best indicates how often you read such articles.;
Hever Uxaetiae* -ten
Navy* s role in peacetime?
Navy's role in wartime?
Sea Power?
New weapons'
National strategy of 9*8<
rticles on NATO, 3 lATO, and
similar military pacts?
£. here do you think that most of the instruction on the Navy's mission
and capabilities should be given
In schools On-the-job floth Don't know
6. one service personnel feel that there is a great amount of information
available from official Navy publications, bo you agree with this""
Yes No
7. Are official Navy publications available to you when you want to read
them?
Yes No
d. In your opinion, how do you think wives of naval personnel feel about
the amount of information they are getting about the Navy?
oelieve they Believe they 'fhey get too much
would like more have enough information now
9» If married, do you think it would help you in your work if your wife
knew more about the Navy?
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10, The television programs called "Victory at Sea" and "Navy Log"
have been produced from Navy background material. Have you seen either
of these programs?
Have seen one Have seen both #ave ROT seen either
11, How effective do you think these programs are in telling the public
about the Navy?
Not effective I airly effective very effective
12. special lectures on the increasing importance of the havy are being
given at many naval caauands. The lecture is illustrated with a series
of color slides showing the new developments and capabilities of the
Navy, Have you seen this presentation?
Yes No
13* Do you feel that the Navy is telling you enough about its mission?
Yes No
lU, How do you feel about the anount of information the Navy gives you
about what* 8 going on within the service'
*• receive too JfiJCH information
___—_—.
e don't receive THOUGH information
W« receive just about the right amount of information
li>. In your opinion, is the Navy giving its people enough training on
the mission and capabilities?
Yes No Undecided
16, «.hat are your suggestions on new ways of keeping naval personnel
infomned about the mission and capabilities of the Navy?
,th





SAMPLE FORMAT FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION ANNEX TO OPERATIONAL PLANS
(Portion pertaining to ecoranendation No* 3)
Public Information Annex
(For a Force Commander)
"ecurity classification* All information relative to this training
exercise will remain unclassified*
Informing personnel* Commanding officers of individual ships and
attached units are authorised and encouraged to advise their personnel
of dates and places involved herein immediately upon receipt of this
plan, nough additional information should be provided personnel so
that they can aake personal plans accordingly*
.Date of release to press * The first news release will be made
by the Force Conmander approximately three weeks in advance of departure
date of ships from the Continental United States.
)onsibiiity for scheduling * It shall be the responsibility of
the Force Plans Officer to advise the Force Public Information Jfficer
of all plans as soon as they are approved. The Force Public Information
Officer will prepare and release the original over-all announcement of
this exercise* The Force 'lans Officer will advise the xorce Public
Information Officer of all Important changes to the original plan and
keep him informed of current progress in execution of this exercise*
(Other instructions in this annex would include policy
matters in regard to news releases by subordinate
commands, coordination between information officers,
transportation of news media representatives embarked
in ships, etc**)
Note: The above is recommended as an addition to Chapter 11,
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A plan for service-wide educa-
tion of Navy personnel on the
mission and capabilities of the
Navy as an instrument of national
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